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In Grutter v. Bollinger, the much-anticipated case challenging
affirmative action practices at the University of Michigan Law School, the
Supreme Court held for the first time that "obtaining the educational
benefits that flow from a diverse student body" represents a compelling
state interest.' Adopting much of Justice Powell's analysis from the
landmark Bakke case,2 the Grutter majority emphasized that racial diversity
within a student body promotes the "'robust exchange of ideas,"' 3 and
renders classroom discussions "'more enlightening and interesting.' '4 The
Court further reasoned that universities deserve substantial leeway in
making admissions decisions because they are uniquely positioned to assess
the pedagogical values associated with racial diversity.
Notably, however, the Court did not confine its analysis of the
educational benefits of diversity to matters concerning the quality of the
educational experience at the University of Michigan. Rather, it relied
heavily on a separate strand of argument that emphasized the need to
1. 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2347 (2003).
2. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
3. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2336 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 (Powell, J.)).
4. Id. at 2340 (quoting Petition for Certiorari app. at 246a, Grutter (No. 02-241)).
5. Id. at 2339 ("Our holding today is in keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of
deference to a university's academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits.").
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produce students whose training or experience "'prepares them as
professionals"' to function effectively within "'an increasingly diverse
workforce. ' , '6 To underscore this point, the Grutter majority described the
American military's reliance on race-conscious recruitment and admissions
policies for its service academies and Reserve Officer Training Corps
(ROTC) programs. Citing claims raised by a group of retired military
personnel in an amicus filing,7 the Court intimated that the return to a
racially homogenous officer corps would compromise the military's ability
to provide national security.8 From here, "'only a small step"' was required
for the Court to conclude that the "'country's other most selective
institutions' likewise depend on racially diverse leadership to ensure their
continued success. 9 Hence, the majority explained that in the realm of
business, "exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and
viewpoints" cultivates skills necessary to succeed in today's "increasingly
global marketplace."' 0 Likewise, it described the visible presence of
minority lawyers in the upper echelons of politics and the judiciary as
crucial to the public's continued confidence in these institutions."
What is striking about these claims is that they regard the project of
diversifying higher education as a means of populating the professional
ranks with a new generation of racially diverse, or at least racially attuned,
leaders. In effect, it is the Court's appeal to these occupational needs for
diversity, as opposed to the intrinsic importance of cross-racial
understanding, that forms much of the basis for its conclusion that the
educational benefits of diversity constitute a compelling state interest.
The notion that racially diverse leadership contributes to the functionality
of certain professions is not a recent innovation. Rather, such claims
have been advanced by numerous industry leaders, 12 sociologists, 13 and
6. Id. at 2340 (quoting Brief of the American Educational Research Association et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Grutter (No. 02-24 1)).
7. Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Grutter (No. 02-241) [hereinafter Becton Brief].
8. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340.
9. Id. (quoting Becton Brief, supra note 7, at 29).
10. Id.
11. According to the Court,
[U]niversities, and in particular, law schools, represent the training ground for a large
number of our Nation's leaders....
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it
is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified
individuals of every race and ethnicity.
Id. at 2341.
12. See, e.g., R. Roosevelt Thomas, Jr., From Affirmative Action to Affirming Diversity, in
DIFFERENCES THAT WORK: ORGANIZATIONAL DIFFERENCE THROUGH DIVERSITY 27 (Mary C.
Gentile ed., 1994) (surveying industry techniques for managing diversity); Joan Crockett, Winning
Competitive Advantage Through a Diverse Workforce, HR Focus, May 1999, at 9 (extolling the
occupational benefits of a more culturally diverse workforce).
13. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law,
106 AM. J. SOC. 1589 (2001) (tracing the growth of occupational need justifications for
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historians. 14 In the legal context, occupational need arguments have most
often arisen as defenses against allegations of racially biased hiring
practices. Accordingly, both Congress and the courts have grappled with
the question of how to strike the proper balance between catering to
important occupational needs and upholding the law's broader prohibition
against racial discrimination. During the legislative debate over Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress resolved this dilemma by
unambiguously rejecting the concept that a person's race could ever
constitute a "bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ). 15 Underpinning
this decision was the overriding fear that employers might otherwise hire
only whites, claiming that this was essential to the smooth functioning of
their businesses.
In light of this statutory barrier, no court has ever accepted occupational
need defenses where racially discriminatory employment practices have
been challenged under Title VII. 16 Paradoxically, however, where such
practices have instead been challenged on Fourteenth Amendment grounds,
courts have increasingly allowed a small number of professions-such as
law enforcement and prison administration-to raise valid occupational
need defenses.' 7 On these occasions, judges have distinguished between
employers merely catering to client preferences and those whose race-
conscious decisionmaking reflects a genuine concern about the
functionality of their profession.
As a result of these developments, the statutory and constitutional
frameworks governing racial discrimination now provide contradictory
responses to occupational need defenses raised by certain professions. This
inconsistency was prominently on display in the recent case of Patrolmen's
Benevolent Ass 'n v. City of New York, in which Judge Scheindlin found that
racially motivated employment decisions furthered the state's compelling
interest in effective law enforcement-thereby satisfying the first prong of
the court's equal protection analysis-yet held that the police were
affirmative action); Erin Kelly & Frank Dobbin, How Affirmative Action Became Diversity
Management, 41 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 960 (1998) (same).
14. See, e.g., JOHN P. FERNANDEZ & MARY BARR, THE DIVERSITY ADVANTAGE: How
AMERICAN BUSINESS CAN OUT-PERFORM JAPANESE AND EUROPEAN COMPANIES IN THE
GLOBAL MARKETPLACE (1993) (concluding that Americans are well-positioned to reap
productivity gains from diversity); Jennifer Lee, Cultural Brokers: Race-Based Hiring in Inner-
City Neighborhoods, 41 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 927 (1998) (outlining past practices of relying
upon occupational need in inner-city hiring).
15. See 110 CONG. REC. 2563 (1964) (tallying the vote, 108 to 70, in which an amendment
that would have added race to the list of potential BFOQ characteristics was defeated).
16. See Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. City of New York, 74 F. Supp. 2d 321, 337
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("[N]o court has actually approved of a race-based BFOQ."); see also cases cited
infra notes 70-71, 73 (confirming the statutory barrier against race-based BFOQ defenses).
17. See, e.g., Reynolds v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 524, 530-31 (7th Cir. 2002) (accepting a
police department's occupational need defense in response to alleged equal protection violations);
see also infra Subsection IV.B. 1.
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nonetheless barred from mounting an occupational need defense under
Title VII.18
Against this backdrop, the Grutter Court further expanded the
boundaries of the constitutional occupational need defense in two important
respects. First, it suggested that a profession's reliance on racially diverse
representation may warrant use of race-conscious admissions procedures at
the stage of professional education. Logically, those professions citing an
occupational interest in the continued use of affirmative action at
universities should be doubly justified in granting preferences to racial
minorities who have actually graduated and entered the labor market.
Rather than consider the tensions that this reasoning would generate with
current Title VII law, however, the Court simply reiterated that its holding
reaches only educational-rather than hiring--decisions. Second, the
Grutter Court identified occupational needs for diversity in fields such as
business and law, which differ substantially from the more public-safety-
oriented occupations that have successfully raised occupational need
defenses in the past. By grouping together professions such as business and
law with the military, whose unique features have entitled it to a special
exemption under Title VII, 19 the Court proceeded on the questionable
assumption that these professions are equally dependent on racially diverse
leadership.
These problematic implications of the Grutter Court's approach were
not lost on the dissenting Justices, who warned that occupational need logic
could not be easily cabined within formal educational settings or confined
to the field of law. Instead, as Justice Scalia lamented, the Court's
reasoning might be used to support discriminatory hiring on the ground that
it injects minority representation into a profession solely to enhance the
"cross-racial understanding"' of nonminority coworkers.2 ° Wary of the
potential for occupational need defenses to shield discriminatory practices
across a limitless array of professions, the dissenting Justices in Grutter
sided with the framers of Title VII by resisting such arguments altogether.
For all its intellectual clarity, however, the Grutter dissent's categorical
rejection of occupational need claims proved no more nuanced than the
majority opinion. Justice Scalia's scathing critique of the Court's logic,
while useful in highlighting the extremes to which occupational need
arguments may be taken, recognized no contexts in which such claims
18. 74 F. Supp. 2d at 329, 339 (Scheindlin, J.).
19. See, e.g., Coffman v. Michigan, 120 F.3d 57, 59 (6th Cir. 1997) ("[U]niformed members
of the armed forces have no remedy under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."); Gonzalez
v. Dep't of the Army, 718 F.2d 926, 927-29 (9th Cir. 1983) (concluding that the term "military
departments" in Title VII applies only to civilian employees of the military and not to
servicemembers).
20. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2349 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at
2339 (majority opinion)).
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could be appropriate. Conspicuously absent from his dissent was any
mention of the military's distinctive justification for affirmative action.
21
Likewise, no consideration was given to other professions that might raise
compelling arguments along similar lines.
Taken as a whole, the Supreme Court's discussion of occupational need
in Grutter proved unsatisfactory in two respects, both of which this Note
addresses. First, both the majority and the dissent adopted a polarized,
all-or-nothing approach to occupational need defenses instead of
acknowledging the possibility that such arguments may be persuasive in
certain contexts while pernicious in others. As an alternative to the Court's
stark approach, what is needed is a theoretical framework for determining
when occupational need arguments should be accepted as compelling state
interests and when they should be rejected as pretextual grounds for racial
discrimination.
This Note begins to develop such a framework through the case study
of the military, the profession that has most often framed its defense of
affirmative action in terms of occupational need. Once the link between
racial awareness and occupational performance is more precisely
understood, we may then consider what institutional features make the
military particularly dependent on racial diversity. To the extent that similar
features exist in other contexts, the military experience should be seen as
translatable, rather than entirely exceptional.
Rather than draw an arbitrary line between higher education and work
settings, this Note proposes that occupational need arguments should be
evaluated according to the characteristics of each profession. Taking into
account the social urgency of a profession as well as the degree to which its
basic functionality depends on race-conscious decisionmaking, I argue that
occupational need defenses should generally be limited to a small subset of
professions that address public safety matters rather than extended to
encompass professions such as business and law.
22 While the appropriate
outer bounds of the occupational need defense will undoubtedly remain
subject to disagreement, the Grutter Court's treatment of occupational need
claims clearly overlooks crucial differences in the nature and degree to
which various professions rely on racially diverse leadership.
21. Understandably, the Grutter Court could not have addressed every secondary issue
relating to affirmative action. Still, considering the prominence of the military's justification for
affirmative action in the media and in oral arguments, the dissent's silence on the matter is
noteworthy. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, 19-22, Grutter (No. 02-241),
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/0
2 -2 4 1 .pdf.
22. Although this Note distinguishes between "public safety" and "non-public safety"
occupations, these labels are used as heuristics and do not imply the existence of rigid categories.
Instead, the strength of occupational need claims must ultimately be evaluated on a case-by-case
basis, looking to the qualities of each individual profession. For instance, a fire department,
despite its public safety orientation, might rely less on a diverse workforce than would a
boot-camp-style prison or a police precinct.
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The second shortcoming of the Grutter decision lies in its failure to
address the growing divide between statutory and constitutional approaches
to occupational need defenses.23 Where racial discrimination has been
alleged, there is now a pressing need for a more unified legal response to
such defenses. As a simple matter of intellectual coherence, Congress and
the courts should agree on the extent to which American law recognizes
that a person's race may affect her ability to perform certain tasks within an
organization or profession. From a judicial perspective, the current
inconsistency between the statutory and constitutional precedents in this
area creates unnecessary confusion, undermining the clarity and force of
opinions that must address occupational need claims.24 Finally, in the
context of public employment discrimination, where Title VII and the
Fourteenth Amendment are most obviously in tension, the success of
occupational need defenses turns primarily on the nature of the allegations
raised, which may be a function of little more than the plaintiffs degree of
legal sophistication. Rather than countenance such anomalies, we should
reconsider the proper place of such arguments within antidiscrimination law
more broadly.
Accordingly, this Note proposes that Congress amend the language of
Title VII to remove the statutory barrier against race-based bona fide
occupational qualification defenses. Courts should then permit occupational
need defenses only in those narrow circumstances where a profession
establishes that racial discrimination is vital to the essence of its business.
Where state actors differentiate on the basis of race, courts should impose
the additional requirement that a profession demonstrate how its disruption
would compromise public safety. By building upon the doctrinal approach
used in response to similar arguments in the sex discrimination context,
courts could construct a limited occupational need defense that would
reduce the potential for abuse while still allowing racial preferences where
they legitimately further a compelling state interest.
The Grutter Court's turn toward occupational need as a prominent
justification for race-conscious decisionmaking is unsettling, even for
23. While this Note primarily addresses the interplay between Title VII and the Equal
Protection Clause, this is not to suggest that these represent the only two modes of challenging
racially discriminatory practices under American law. Another important tool in the
antidiscrimination arsenal is Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which dictates that persons
may not be excluded from participating in federally funded programs or activities on the basis of"race, color, sex [or] national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). Beginning with Bakke, however,
the Supreme Court has maintained that Title VI merely incorporates constitutional standards, and
therefore affirmative action plans that satisfy equal protection inquiries have not been thought to
independently violate Title VI. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287
(1978) (Powell, J.); id. at 352 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.) ("Title VI's
definition of racial discrimination is absolutely coextensive with the Constitution's .... ").
24. See, e.g., Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. City of New York, 74 F. Supp. 2d 321
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding that race-based police assignments were constitutionally defensible but
statutorily impermissible due to the Title VII prohibition against race-based BFOQ claims).
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proponents of affirmative action. The doctrine of occupational need is
malleable and may be used to defend forms of racial discrimination that do
not comport with societally held conceptions of racial justice. Insofar as we
would balk at the notion of discriminating against racial minorities for the
sake of preserving an occupation's survival, we should question whether
concern over occupational needs is what truly motivates our support for
affirmative action policies at institutions such as the University of Michigan
Law School. If instead our commitment to affirmative action stems from
some deeper value,25 then this value should be openly acknowledged and
discussed rather than hidden behind the guise of an occupational need
rationale. Indeed, occupational need arguments risk diverting attention from
the social justice claims that would otherwise underpin the campaign for
affirmative action.26 For these reasons, I sympathize with the outcome in
Grutter yet remain wary of expanding the occupational need rationale as it
pertains to race.
To warn against the potential excesses of occupational need defenses is
not to preclude their use under all circumstances, however. By advocating
rigorous scrutiny of occupational need claims, this Note seeks to limit such
claims to situations where race-conscious measures genuinely contribute to
an occupation's functionality and where the smooth operation of that
occupation is of paramount interest.
Part I of this Note situates the Grutter outcome within the context of the
Supreme Court's earlier affirmative action jurisprudence. This Part begins
by examining how the Court's understanding of what constitutes a
compelling state interest has expanded to include forward-looking or
nonremedial justifications for affirmative action. The remainder of the Part
outlines the salient features of what I have identified as the Grutter Court's
occupational need rationale for diversity.
Part 1I considers the most serious criticisms of the occupational need
rationale, comparing claims that appear in the Grutter dissents with similar
arguments that have arisen in previous cases and legislative debate. Part III
evaluates the case for affirmative action in military higher education with
an eye toward assessing which features make certain institutions better able
to invoke occupational need arguments than others.
25. For instance, some scholars have defended the continued use of affirmative action on
social justice grounds. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 471
(1997) (advancing a constitutional justice argument for affirmative action). Others have
distinguished between "anti-differentiation" and "anti-subordination" approaches to understanding
American antidiscrimination law. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex,
Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1005-10 (1986). From within the
antisubordination paradigm, affirmative action advocates resist the notion that all racial
discrimination is equally undesirable, regardless of the group being disadvantaged.
26. By "managerializing" legal claims, occupational need arguments may "undermine law's
moral commitment to redressing historical wrongs." See Edelman et al., supra note 13, at 1632.
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Drawing lessons from the military case study, Part IV suggests a
framework for how to approach occupational need defenses in the future,
arguing that a limited occupational need defense would strike the proper
balance between preserving occupational performance and creating a
dangerous precedent that invites invidious discrimination. Part V then
advances a two-part proposal for harmonizing the statutory and
constitutional approaches to occupational need defenses. It concludes by
underscoring the important role that judges must play in limiting race-based
occupational need defenses once the statutory barrier against such claims
has been removed.
I. DEFINING "COMPELLING STATE INTEREST":
BEFORE AND AFTER GRUTTER
It is now a settled principle that the "government may treat people
differently because of their race only for the most compelling reasons" and
only when there are substantial assurances that no invidious purpose is
afoot.27 Translated into the language of equal protection jurisprudence, all
racial classifications imposed by public entities must satisfy "strict
scrutiny. ' '28 In practice, this means that courts apply a two-prong test-the
first prong requiring that the policy in question further a compelling
governmental interest, and the second requiring that the policy be narrowly
tailored to achieve that end. This Note does not address the narrow-tailoring
dimension of the strict scrutiny test, yet this is not to overlook its
importance in the constitutional debate over affirmative action. Indeed, the
divergent outcomes in Grutter and its sister case, Gratz v. Bollinger,9 can
be explained primarily by perceived differences in how tightly the programs
in those cases were tailored to achieve their objectives. Still, the question of
what constitutes a compelling state interest is also important, as no
affirmative action plan can survive constitutional scrutiny without
articulating such an interest.
A. Remedial and Nonremedial Justifications for Affirmative Action
Until recently, the only justifications for affirmative action that a
majority of the Court had deemed sufficiently compelling to satisfy strict
scrutiny were backward-looking or remedial in nature.3° Thus, where an
27. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
28. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion).
29. 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
30. The Court accepted a forward-looking rationale for affirmative action, namely the
preservation of broadcast diversity, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 566
(1990), overruled by Adarand, 515 U.S. 200. In Metro Broadcasting, the Court applied
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institution could point to a specific instance of unlawful discrimination in
the past, it was free to implement race-conscious measures to undo the
harm it had caused.3 ' The basic appeal of this remedial logic was twofold.
First, affirmative action plans targeted at redressing a particular quantum of
harm had clearer, more finite endpoints. This reassured Justices who
believed that the Court should not endorse open-ended schemes designed to
engineer a more socially desirable racial balance.
3 2 Second, remedial
affirmative action plans adhered more closely to the legislative purpose
behind Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. In United Steelworkers
of America v. Weber, the Court established that only those racial
classifications that mirror the remedial purposes of Title VII and "do not
unnecessarily trammel the interests" of whites can survive constitutional
challenge.33
Prior to Grutter, it remained unclear under what circumstances, if any,
the Court would accept nonremedial justifications for affirmative action. On
this issue, Justice O'Connor suggested in her plurality opinion in City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. that racial classifications should be "strictly
reserved for remedial settings" lest they "in fact promote notions of racial
inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility.
3 4 The Court carefully
adhered to this basic rule of thumb over the past two decades, rejecting
affirmative action plans that sought to achieve more forward-looking results
such as preserving a critical mass of minority role models.
35
intermediate rather than strict scrutiny on the ground that benign discrimination merited a lesser
standard of review. Id. at 564-65. Five years later in Adarand, however, the Court reversed course,
holding that strict scrutiny was the proper standard for all government-initiated racial
classifications. 515 U.S. at 227. See generally Derek Black, Comment, The Case for the New
Compelling Government Interest: Improving Educational Outcomes, 80 N.C. L. REV. 923, 930
(2002) (describing the Court's treatment of remedial and nonremedial justifications for affirmative
action).
31. Public employers may remedy both their own past discrimination and that of private
actors where the government has been a "passive participant" in the private actors' discriminatory
practices. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 492 (plurality opinion); id. at 519 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
32. Justice O'Connor in particular has emphasized the duration of affirmative action
programs. See, e.g., id. at 498 (majority opinion) (explaining the Court's reluctance to endorse
affirmative action plans with "'no logical stopping point"' (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 275 (1986) (plurality opinion))); cf Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325,
2347 (2003) (O'Connor, J.) ("We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will
no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.").
33. 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979); see also Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616,
630-31 (1987) (extending the logic of Weber to public affirmative action programs).
34. 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion).
35. See, e.g., Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274-76 (plurality opinion) (denying a compelling state
interest in hiring minority teachers to serve as role models for minority students); see also
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Comment: Sins of Discrimination: Last
Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78, 86-91 (1986) (situating the Court's
response to the role model argument in Wygant within the context of its 1980s jurisprudence,
which emphasized remedial justifications for affirmative action).
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The lone context in which a nonremedial justification for affirmative
action had persisted over time was higher education-and even there its
legal position had become extremely precarious. 36 In recent years, courts
had begun to chip away at the constitutionality of the diversity rationale
articulated by Justice Powell in Bakke, questioning its weight as precedent 37
and prompting the Supreme Court to revisit the issue in the University of
Michigan cases. Lower courts disagreed over how to interpret the Court's
few pronouncements on the status of nonremedial justifications for
affirmative action. In Taxman v. Board of Education, Judge Mansmann
concluded on both statutory and constitutional grounds that "a non-remedial
affirmative action plan, even one with a laudable purpose, cannot pass
muster. ' ,38 By contrast, then-Chief Judge Posner reasoned that because the
Court had not spoken categorically on the matter, nonremedial justifications
could still be permissible under certain circumstances.39
In Grutter, the Supreme Court explained that, notwithstanding certain
language in past opinions, it had "never held that the only governmental use
of race that can survive strict scrutiny is remedying past discrimination. 'A'
In a narrow sense, this statement enabled the Court to conclude that
preserving a racially diverse student body represented a compelling state
interest. More broadly, the Court's pronouncement opened the door to a
host of forward-looking justifications for affirmative action that, until
recently, would have been categorically rejected by many lower courts.
Having laid to rest its insistence on remedial justifications, the Court will
now face the delicate task of balancing the harms of racial stigmatization
against policy benefits that are neither easily measured nor time-delimited.
B. The Occupational Need Rationale
The Grutter Court's discussion of compelling state interest was divided
into two segments. The first of these addressed the pedagogical benefits of
the law school's affirmative action policies, while the second concentrated
on the "educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body.' In its
initial analysis, the Court posited that cross-racial dialogue breaks down
stereotypes and promotes "livelier, more spirited, and simply more
enlightening and interesting" classroom discussions.42 Borrowing from
Justice Powell's analysis in Bakke, the Court expressed the view that
36. See Goodwin Liu, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: The Diversity Rationale and
the Compelling Interest Test, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 381, 381 (1998).
37. Id. (citing Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996)).
38. 91 F.3d 1547, 1550 (3d Cir. 1996) (Mansmann, J.).
39. See Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 918 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J.).
40. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2339 (2003).
41. Id. at 2347.
42. Id. at 2339-40 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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rigorous academic discourse most often takes place when students share a
variety of viewpoints borne out of their diverse experiences.43
After reviewing the pedagogical benefits of diversity, the Grutter
majority turned to another line of arguments that in its view "further
bolstered" the law school's claim of a compelling state interest. 4 What
these arguments shared in common was their recognition of the important
role that universities play in preparing students to succeed in their chosen
professions. Specifically, the Court described the pressing need for
tomorrow's leaders to interact capably with people from diverse cultural
backgrounds. In order to cultivate those skills, students should be
"expos[ed] to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints., 45 The
Court did not dwell on the importance of racial sensitivity as a virtue in its
own right. Rather, the development of greater cross-racial understanding
was characterized as a means of promoting the smooth functioning of
"today's increasingly global marketplace," 46 preserving "'the military's
ability to fulfill its principle [sic] mission to provide national security, ' ''4
and cultivating a set of political and judicial leaders "with legitimacy in the
eyes of the citizenry.
' ' 8
Upon close examination, it is the broader societal importance of the
professions themselves that renders these concerns compelling state
interests. That is, because these underlying professions cannot function
effectively under racially homogenous leadership, affirmative action
programs are warranted. 49 This notion-which I have termed the Court's
occupational need rationale-is not new, even within the Supreme Court's
own affirmative action jurisprudence. In Bakke, Justice Powell hinted at the
concept, stating that the "'nation's future depends upon leaders trained
through wide exposure' to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this
43. The Court carefully avoided the conclusion that a person's race is determinative of her
viewpoints: "Just as growing up in a particular region or having particular professional
experiences is likely to affect an individual's views, so too is one's own, unique experience of
being a racial minority in society .... Id. at 2341.
44. Id. at 2340.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. (quoting Becton Brief, supra note 7, at [5]).
48. Id. at 2341.
49. It is worth distinguishing certain aspects of the occupational need rationale for diversity
from other nonremedial justifications for affirmative action that the Court has rejected in the past.
For instance, with respect to the legal profession, the majority did not contend simply that children
need more minority role models, but rather that the visible presence of racial minorities in
positions of authority preserves public confidence in politics and the judiciary as institutions.
Likewise, occupational need arguments should not be equated with past efforts to justify racial
preferences as remedies for general societal discrimination. Here, the compelling state interest
being described is fundamentally forward-looking: It asserts that professional training and
experience must keep pace with particular societal changes and institutional demands.
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Nation of many peoples. 5 ° In Grutter, however, the Court took this
analysis several steps further, accepting the insights of amici whose briefs
described in greater detail the need for racially attuned leaders in their
respective professions.5'
In particular, the Grutter majority cited the occupational need
arguments raised by representatives in the fields of business, law, and the
military. Listing these examples one after the next, the Court left several
important questions unanswered: Do these professions share the same kinds
of occupational needs for diversity? How acute are those needs in each
case? Should occupational need arguments carry equal weight across all
professional contexts? With regard to this last question, the Court seemed to
generalize on the basis of the military example, needing "'only a small step
from [the military's] analysis to conclude that our country's other most
selective institutions must remain both diverse and selective."'' 52 Before
turning to a more detailed analysis of the military case study, it is helpful to
consider the most prominent criticisms of the occupational need rationale.
II. CRITIQUING THE OCCUPATIONAL NEED RATIONALE
A. The Grutter Dissents
The Grutter majority's invocation of a new line of occupational need
arguments was readily apparent to the dissenting Justices. In response, these
Justices expressed one overriding concern-namely that an occupational
need rationale, when carried to its logical extreme, would threaten to engulf
a substantial portion of antidiscrimination law by creating a new pretext for
racial discrimination.
53
It follows logically from the Grutter opinion that occupational need
arguments will be used to justify the continued use of race-conscious
admissions procedures at other universities. If we suppose that all
professions stand to benefit from the addition of more racially aware
students to their ranks, then affirmative action programs at all types of
universities presumably serve a compelling state interest. Even at
undergraduate colleges, where students may not enter the workforce for
some time, affirmative action proponents may shift gears and defend their
policies on the grounds that they promote good citizenship and contribute to
50. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978) (Powell, J.) (quoting
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
51. Gruter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340.
52. Id. (quoting Becton Brief, supra note 7, at 29).
53. Thus, Justice Thomas bemoaned the lack of "any theoretical constraints on an
enterprising court's desire to discover still more justifications for racial discrimination" in the
future. Id. at 2354 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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the smooth functioning of our democracy-our most important social
institution.
54
Of greater concern to the dissenting Justices in Grutter, however, was
the potential for occupational need arguments to spill over into other
contexts beyond higher education. As Justice Scalia noted, if racial
understanding is "properly considered an 'educational benefit' at all, it is
surely not one that is either uniquely relevant to law school or uniquely
'teachable' in a formal educational setting." 55 If the law school may make
race-conscious admissions decisions "for the purpose of putting together a
'critical mass' that will convey generic lessons in socialization and good
citizenship," it follows that Michigan's civil service system may do the
same. 56 Indeed, as Justice Scalia warned, any employer could defend a
discriminatory hiring scheme on the ground that it promotes greater racial
understanding and awareness-the very traits that multinational
corporations have deemed crucial to their occupational survival.
57
The majority did not respond to this criticism directly. At best, it sought
to limit the scope of its occupational need claims by restricting their
applicability to the university setting. To achieve this, the Court established
that universities have traditionally enjoyed a unique degree of insulation
from judicial criticism. 58 The difficulty with this analysis, however, is that it
refers to those university decisions that bear on pedagogical matters, where
universities possess special competence. The same arguments do not apply
as persuasively to a university's ability to gauge the long-term needs of
various professions whose ranks its students will eventually join.
Furthermore, an emphasis on educational autonomy does not respond to
the dissent's basic criticism that occupational need arguments are not
logically limited to the educational arena. If the compelling state interest in
question is the continued viability of certain institutions that depend on
racially aware leadership, then all measures narrowly tailored to further this
objective should presumably be treated alike, regardless of whether they
originate from a university in the form of an admissions decision, or from
an employer in the form of a hiring decision. In other words, the same
"educational benefits" that flow from student body diversity in one case
may accrue as a result of other measures that discriminate on the basis of
54. The majority referred to education as 'the very foundation of good citizenship."' Id. at
2340 (majority opinion) (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)). In his
dissent, Justice Scalia openly mocked the notion that the government should endorse the teaching
of "good citizenship" through "patriotic, all-American system[s] of racial discrimination." Id. at
2349 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 2349.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2339 (majority opinion) ("We have long recognized that, given the important
purpose of public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the
university environment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition.").
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race. If anything, racially discriminatory hiring or promotions are arguably
more likely to have a demonstrable effect on occupational performance than
are university admissions decisions.
B. Historical Antecedents
The debate over the proper place of occupational need arguments
within antidiscrimination law has a much longer pedigree than the Grutter
Court acknowledged. Since the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
Congress and the federal courts have grappled with the question of whether
race may constitute a bona fide occupational qualification under certain
circumstances. A review of both the legislative debate over the language of
Title VII and subsequent judicial interpretations of the statute reveals that
the predominant tendency has been to reject such arguments. Many of the
same fears raised by the Grutter dissent concerning the potential abuses of
occupational need claims were voiced nearly four decades ago.
Interestingly, the primary concern at that time was that biased whites would
employ occupational need arguments in defense of racially homogenous
hiring practices. Today, by contrast, the dissent in Grutter warns of the risk
that such arguments will be used by affirmative action proponents with an
unspoken desire to promote a particular vision of racial justice.
The well-known purpose of Title VII is to prevent any employer from
discriminating against individuals on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.5 9 Less well-known, however, is that the statute contains
one exception for intentional discrimination: Businesses may differentiate
between employees on the basis of a person's "religion, sex, or national
origin in those instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona
fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise., 60 Notably, the statute
does not make any allowance for occupational need defenses with respect
61to race. Speaking directly to the exclusion of race from the listed
exemptions, one congressman stated simply: "We did not include the word
'race' because we felt that race or color would not be a bona fide
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
60. Id. § 2000e-2(e)(1). While the statutory exception for BFOQs applies in cases of
intentional discrimination, the "business necessity" doctrine serves as a limited defense in cases
where a facially neutral practice merely proves discriminatory in operation. See Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (explaining the scope of the "business necessity" defense).
61. See Note, Race as an Employment Qualification To Meet Police Department Operational
Needs, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 413, 436 (1979) ("Race is simply not listed as one of the possible
exceptions to [Title VII's] sweeping prohibition of employment discrimination.... [Tihe
legislative history of Title VII and the BFOQ exception clearly evidences a congressional intent to
exclude BFOQ exceptions based on race from section 703(e).").
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qualification, as would be 'national origin.' [Race] was left out. It should be
left out."
62
Legislative debate over proposed amendments to Title VII left little
doubt that Congress specifically intended to prevent civilian employers
from making occupational need arguments based on race.63 In the House,
Representative John Williams introduced a provocative amendment that
would have added race and color into the language of the occupational need
exception. During the floor debate, Representative Williams and his
supporters warned that without such a concession, many black-owned
businesses, ranging from insurance companies to radio stations, would be
forced to hire whites, thereby losing credibility with their clientele. In one
memorable exhortation, Williams stated:
I doubt if many of our northern or western colleagues ever heard of
such a thing as a pomade known as a "hair straightener" or a
product known as skin whitener. These products are sold in every
little store in the South. They are manufactured by Negroes and
sold exclusively to Negroes. Do you want to put them out of
business?
64
Apparently of greater interest to his colleagues was the fate of political
parties, which without the amendment would no longer be permitted to hire
only black electioneers to perform the function of recruiting black votes.
65
Opponents of the Williams amendment pointed out that such a provision
would equally enable white businesses to hire only whites, 66 and this
argument helped defeat the proposal.67
An even broader amendment introduced by Senator John McClellan
would have permitted an employer to use race-conscious hiring practices
whenever "[he] believe[d], on the basis of substantial evidence, that the
hiring of such an individual ... would be more beneficial to the normal
operations of his particular business., 68 Here again, however, opponents
62. 110 CONG. REc. 2550 (1964) (statement of Rep. Celler).
63. See William R. Bryant, Note, Justifiable Discrimination: The Need for a Statutory Bona
Fide Occupational Qualification Defense for Race Discrimination, 33 GA. L. REV. 211, 215-18
(1998) (describing in greater detail the legislative history behind Title VII's BFOQ exemption).
64. 110 CONG. REC. 2550 (1964) (statement of Rep. Williams).
65. Id. at 2553 (statement of Rep. Fulton) (discussing the effects of the proposed Title VII on
political parties).
66. For instance, Representative Emanuel Celler warned that an occupational need exemption
for racial discrimination threatened to establish a loophole "that could well gut this title." Id. at
2556 (statement of Rep. Celler); see also id. at 2559 (statement of Rep. Corman) ("The only
logical conclusion would be that we would do the same thing for white... companies that want to
hire only white people.").
67. Id. at 2563 (tallying the vote in which the amendment was defeated 108 to 70).
68. Id. at 13,825.
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warned that such a measure would undermine the efficacy of the Civil
Rights Act, and the amendment was defeated.69
Since the language of the Civil Rights Act was first negotiated on the
floor of Congress, judges have considered numerous cases in which
defendants have sought to shield racially discriminatory hiring practices
from Title VII challenges by raising occupational need defenses. Courts
have universally rejected these arguments, citing Title VII's specific
prohibition of occupational need defenses in cases involving racial
discrimination.70 For instance, in the Second Circuit case of Knight v.
Nassau County Civil Service Commission, a black employee successfully
sued his employer under Title VII for transferring him to the minority
recruitment department against his preference and solely on the basis of his
race. 7 Judge Oakes explained:
No matter how laudable the Commission's intention might be in
trying to attract more minority applicants to the Civil Service the
fact remains that Knight was assigned a particular job (against his
wishes) because his race was believed to specially qualify him for
the work. This is a violation of Title VII.7
In a similar case in the Fifth Circuit, Judge Simpson suggested that a
state board of inspections may have violated Title VII by assigning a black
employee to inspect only black barbershops because his race made him less
likely to be subjected to physical violence in dangerous inner-city
neighborhoods.73 As these opinions demonstrate, even when presented with
cogent arguments as to why race furthers an occupational interest, federal
courts have deferred to Congress's judgment that those accused of violating
Title VII by engaging in racially discriminatory hiring shall have no
recourse to occupational need defenses.
C. An Absence of Theory
Given concerns over the potentially limitless scope of occupational
need arguments, what is lacking is a rigorous doctrinal framework to help
69. Id. at 13,825-26 (tallying the vote in which the amendment was defeated 61 to 30).
70. See, e.g., Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1308 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Title VII's
defense of bona fide occupational qualification ... is unavailable where discrimination is based
on race, color, or ethnicity." (citation omitted)), superseded by statute on other grounds, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071-72 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (2000)); Burwell v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 370 n.13 (4th Cir. 1980) ("The
statutory BFOQ defense.., is not permitted as a defense to race discrimination in employment.").
71. 649 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1981) (Oakes, J.).
72. Id. at 162.
73. Miller v. Tex. State Bd. of Barber Exam'rs, 615 F.2d 650, 651 (5th Cir. 1980)
(Simpson, J.).
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distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate occupational 
need claims in
the area of race. Without a theory of what makes certain professions 
more
dependent on racial diversity and racial sensitivity than others, courts must
either accept or reject occupational need arguments on a categorical 
basis.
To jettison the concept entirely would be to ignore the reality 
that racial
awareness can play a vital role within certain professional 
contexts. On the
other hand, to embrace the concept without qualification, or 
to generalize
reflexively across all professions, would be to risk precisely 
the kinds of
abuses that Congress warned of during the Title VII debate 
and that the
dissent in Grutter has recently revisited.
One way to develop a workable doctrinal framework in this 
area is to
study professions that have made strong occupational need 
arguments in the
past, with an eye toward understanding what features 
make them
particularly reliant on racially diverse leadership. Taking 
this approach, I
now turn to the case study of the military, a profession regarded 
by many
as having a legitimate need for racial diversity in its officer 
corps. Because
of the unique history of race relations between 
black and white
servicemembers, the African-American military experience 
serves as the
focal point of my inquiry.
III. THE HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN MILITARY
HIGHER EDUCATION: A CASE STUDY
A. From Segregation to Affirmative Action
African Americans have fought in every war the United States 
has
waged,74 yet throughout most of American history, black 
soldiers were
relegated to segregated units, assigned primarily menial tasks, 
and denied
recognition of their sacrifices.
75 In the wake of World War II, the American
military abolished its longstanding practice of racial segregation 
in
accordance with President Truman's Executive Order 
9981, which
mandated "equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons 
in the
armed services without regard to race, 
color, religion or national origin.
76
This pronouncement, while unmistakably progressive for its 
era, was
74. MICHAEL LEE LANNING, THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN 
SOLDIER: FROM CRISPUS ATTUCKS
TO COLIN POWELL 292 (1997).
75. See generally BERNARD C. NALTY, STRENGTH 
FOR THE FIGHT: A HISTORY OF BLACK
AMERICANS IN THE MILITARY (1986) (describing the treatment 
of black soldiers from colonial
times through the Vietnam War).
76. Exec. Order No. 9981, 3 C.F.R. § 617.1 (1948). 
For an excellent history of the racial
integration of the American military, see NAT'L DEF. 
RESEARCH INST., RAND, SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AND U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY: OPTIONS 
AND ASSESSMENT 158 (1993),
http://www.rand.org/pubtications/MR/MR323/index-html 
(under "5. Potential Insights from
Analogous Situations Integrating Blacks into the U.S. Military" 
hyperlink).
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motivated in part by the military's assessment that an integrated force
would be more efficient and combat-ready.77 Shortly thereafter, pressing
shortages of manpower during the Korean War ensured the demise of
quotas restricting African Americans from entering the armed forces.78
Although the military announced the integration of its last segregated unit
on October 30, 1954 79-just five months after the Supreme Court's ruling
in Brown v. Board of Education-military culture was slow to adapt,
evolving gradually against the backdrop of the civil rights movement. In the
meantime, black servicemen continued to encounter profound
discrimination, and residual tensions sparked "a wave of serious race riots
at military installations in the United States and around the world between
1941 and 1946. "8o
If desegregation represented the military's most important racial
reform, it was soon followed by another challenge-that of integrating the
leadership ranks. In the three decades following President Truman's
desegregation order, African Americans never comprised more than four
percent of the military's commissioned officers, despite a growing
proportion of black troops in the enlisted ranks. 81 Only 116 black officers
graduated from the three major service academies in 1968, yet this
represented an enormous increase over the fifty-one black officers who had
graduated between 1963 and 1968, and the sixty who had graduated
between 1877 and 1963.82 While ROTC programs were then, as now, a
major source of black officers, only a tiny percentage of all such
commissions were granted to students at historically black colleges and
universities throughout the 1960s.83
As the enlisted personnel grew increasingly diverse, the presence of an
almost exclusively white officer corps exacerbated racial tensions,
occasionally to the point of jeopardizing the common sense of purpose
necessary for military effectiveness. 84 Lieutenant General Frank Petersen,
77. See MORRIS J. MACGREGOR, JR., INTEGRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES, 1940-1965, at
397, 428 (1981).
78. Id. at 459.
79. Id. at 473.
80. NAT'L DEF. RESEARCH INST., supra note 76, at 179.
81. Thus, African Americans comprised 2.3% of all military officers in 1971, 3.4% in 1976,
and 4% in 1978. NALTY, supra note 75, at 313, 340. Over this time period, the proportion of black
troops in the enlisted ranks rose to 18.4% in 1978. Id. at 340. Aggregate statistics mask significant
differences across service branches. For example, in 1976 the Army enrolled 23.7% black enlisted
soldiers and 5.2% black officers, compared to the Navy's 8% black enlisted soldiers and just 1.6%
black officers. Id.; see also MACGREGOR, supra note 77, at 568 (providing statistics for the 1960s
by branch).
82. MACGREGOR, supra note 77, at 569.
83. Id. at 570.
84. See NAT'L DEF. RESEARCH INST., supra note 76, at 180 ("Armed forces experienced
numerous outbreaks of racial hostility and violence in a worldwide pattern .... Riots and protests
at bases in the United States and abroad, and even on Navy ships at sea, reached a level that
clearly undermined morale and threatened to impede the smooth functioning of military units.").
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Jr., recalled the state of race relations within the Marine Corps during the
Vietnam War, saying, "In Vietnam, racial tensions reached a point where
there was an inability to fight .... We were pulling aircraft carriers off line
because there was so much internal fighting.... Platoons that were 80
percent minority were being led by lieutenants from Yale who had never
dealt with ghetto blacks."
85
In 1969 and 1970 alone, the Army catalogued more than 300 race-
related internal disturbances, which resulted in the deaths of seventy-one
American troops.86 The racial politics of the era, and the unpopularity of the
draft in particular, contributed to heightened levels of dissension within the
ranks throughout the Vietnam War. Yet in drawing lessons from this era,
the military also concluded that officers' difficulties interacting with racial
minorities within their charge substantially impaired their ability to
anticipate, forestall, and subdue such uprisings.87 The military further
surmised that the dearth of black officers had weakened morale by
depriving young black servicemen of role models and confirming their
suspicions that the military had no place for African Americans within its
leadership ranks.
88
The need to recruit more black officers, though widely acknowledged,
did not immediately prompt the Department of Defense to establish a
coordinated affirmative action strategy. 89 Instead, the military branches
developed ad hoc internal policies designed to spark minorities' interest in
military careers and expand the pool of applicants to service academies or
ROTC programs. 90 In 1988, the Department of Defense issued Directive
1350.2, requiring each branch to formulate, maintain, and review
85. David Maraniss, U.S. Military Struggles To Make Equality Work, WASH. POST, Mar. 6,
1990, at A l (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. See NALTY, supra note 75, at 309.
87. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Spec. Subcomm. on Disciplinary Problems in the U.S. Navy
of the Comm. on Armed Servs., 93d Cong. 16-17 (1973) [hereinafter Disciplinary Problems]
(testimony of Admiral E.R. Zumwalt, Jr.) (recommending enhanced racial sensitivity training for
commanders and enlisted men alike as a means of reducing racial uprisings aboard naval vessels);
see also ALAN L. GROPMAN, THE AIR FORCE INTEGRATES: 1945-1964, at 159-63 (2d ed. 1998)
(describing the May 1971 race riot at Travis Air Force Base and the impetus it provided for
greater racial sensitivity training of officers); NALTY, supra note 75, at 317 ("Violence and even
death proved necessary to drive home the realization that ... even commanding officers had only
the faintest idea what the black man and woman in the service were thinking.").
88. 1 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF
MILITARY JUSTICE IN THE ARMED FORCES 57-59 (1972), reprinted in 13 BLACKS IN THE UNITED
STATES ARMED FORCES: BASIC DOCUMENTS 455, 529-31 (Morris J. MacGregor & Bernard C.
Nalty eds., 1977).
89. In fact, the 1962 Committee on Equality of Opportunity in the Armed Forces (the Gesell
Committee) considered and rejected an early proposal to provide preferential treatment for blacks
to achieve better representation in the leadership ranks. MACGREGOR, supra note 77, at 539.
90. See id. at 567-69 (discussing various innovative recruitment practices unveiled in the
1960s).
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affirmative action plans with "established objectives and milestones." 9 1 To
the present, each branch remains free to develop its own policies provided it
achieves the common goals of promoting diversity and fostering racial
sensitivity within the officer corps.
Setting aside direct professional appointments, such as those for JAG
and medical personnel, most military officers begin their training either in
one of the three major service academies or in an ROTC program.
92
Although each service branch operates its own affirmative action scheme,
racial minority status is almost universally used as a "plus factor" in
admissions. 93 At West Point, the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) sets
targets for minority admissions based on "minorities' representation in the
national population and in the national pool of college bound people, and
their representation in the Army. 94 Similarly, the U.S. Naval Academy
(USNA) has stated that "[b]ecause of the lower qualification rate of
minorities, the Academy makes offers of appointment to the majority of
qualified minorities to achieve the Chief of Naval Operations'
commissioning goals for minorities." 95 Thus, the Navy actively monitors
USNA actions to ensure the commissioning of "at least seven percent Black
Navy officers annually starting with USNA Class of 1994. "96 The U.S. Air
Force Academy (USAFA) suggests that its admissions standards are the
same for minorities and whites. However, it notes that between 1991 and
1995, 28% of white applicants met the minimum criteria compared to 18%
of minority applicants, yet 76% of eligible minorities received offers
compared to 51% of eligible whites.97 Finally, the U.S. Coast Guard, while
insisting that it does not accept academy candidates on the basis of race,
nonetheless provides special scholarships and training programs available
exclusively for college students enrolled "at an approved institution with a
minimum 25% minority population.
98
91. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 1350.2 § 4.4 (2003), http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/
corres/pdf/d I 3502wch 1_081895/dI 3502p.pdf (reciting the text of the 1988 directive).
92. Approximately 17% of officers hail from an academy, 40% from ROTC, 17% from
Officer Training/Candidate School (OTS/OCS), 21% from direct appointment, and 5% from other
sources. OFFICE OF THE UNDERSECRETARY OF DEF. PERS. & READINESS, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF.,
CAREER PROGRESSION OF MINORITY AND WOMEN OFFICERS 18 (1999).
93. See id. at 19-20 (describing the relationship between broader Department of Defense
goals and individual branch policies).
94. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-94-95, MILITARY ACADEMY: GENDER
AND RACIAL DISPARITIES 13 (1994).
95. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-93-54, NAVAL ACADEMY: GENDER AND
RACIAL DISPARITIES 38 (1993).
96. U.S. DEP'T OF THE NAVY, OPNAV INSTRUCTION No. 5354.3D, NAVY AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION PLAN 10 (1991), http://neds.nebt.daps.mi/Directives/5354d3.pdf.
97. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-93-244, AIR FORCE ACADEMY: GENDER
AND RACIAL DISPARITIES 34-35 (1993).
98. U.S. Coast Guard & Coast Guard Reserve, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., College Student
Pre-Commissioning Initiative (CSPI), at http://www.gocoastguard.com/cspi.html (last visited
Dec. 1, 2003).
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In addition to adjusting their admissions criteria, service academies
target minorities in their preapplication recruiting and training efforts. In
particular, academy preparatory schools play a major role in boosting the
number of racial minorities qualified to enter the service academies.
Originally created to prepare enlisted personnel for redeployment into the
officer corps, these preparatory schools now train substantial numbers of
racial minorities who need an additional year after high school to develop
their academy credentials. 99 In 1990, for instance, the three major
preparatory academies-the U.S. Military Academy Preparatory School
(USMAPS), U.S. Naval Academy Preparatory School (USNAPS), and U.S.
Air Force Academy Preparatory School (USAFAPS)-admitted a
combined total of 905 students, a robust number considering that only 3963
cadets and midshipmen were admitted to the actual service academies in the
same year. 00 Racial minorities comprise nearly one-quarter of the class at
USMAPS and nearly half of the class at USNAPS and USAFAPS.1
0l
Correspondingly, about one-third of all minorities admitted to the service
academies have benefited from a year of boot-camp-style training at an
academy preparatory school. 0 2 As a result of this additional training,
service academies ensure that their incoming classes are more uniformly
qualified, with everyone meeting certain baseline requirements of
knowledge and physical fitness. At a cost of between $40,000 and $60,000
per student, these fully subsidized schools represent a substantial
government investment.10 3 Although admission to preparatory academies is
open to all students, preference is given on the basis of race.1
0 4
Likewise, ROTC scholarships are disproportionately allotted to racial
minorities as enticements to consider a career in the armed forces. In the
Army, for instance, black applicants are two times more likely to be
awarded an ROTC scholarship than white applicants due to the large
number of scholarships earmarked for historically black colleges and
universities. 0 5 In 1996, historically black colleges and universities
99. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-92-57, DOD SERVICE ACADEMIES:
ACADEMY PREPARATORY SCHOOLS NEED A CLEARER MISSION AND BETTER OVERSIGHT 11
(1992).
100. Id. at 9. In 1990, USMAPS enrolled 303 students, USAFAPS enrolled 256 students,
and USNAPS enrolled 346, 36 of whom were preparing for admission to the Coast Guard
Academy. Id.
101. Id. at 13 fig.2.1. These data are drawn from the preparatory school classes of 1988-1989
and 1989-1990. Id. at 12.
102. See OFFICE OF THE UNDERSECRETARY OF DEF. PERS. & READINESS, supra note 92, at
35-39 (providing disaggregated statistics for the Army, Navy, and Air Force).
103. See CHARLES C. MOSKOS & JOHN SIBLEY BUTLER, ALL THAT WE CAN BE 91 (1996).
104. See Becton Brief, supra note 7, at 24 ("Each preparatory academy uses a race-conscious
admission policy.").
105. MOSKOS & BUTLER, supra note 103, at 84. This disparity exists despite the significantly
lower SAT scores and high school grade point averages of candidates at historically black
colleges and universities. CADET COMMAND HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY, SCHOLARSHIP FACT
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
11132004]
The Yale Law Journal
accounted for over forty percent of all ROTC commissions awarded to
African Americans in the Army, Navy, and Marines, and one-third of all
such commissions in the Air Force.10 6 To raise awareness about ROTC
opportunities, Junior ROTC programs have been introduced to a growing
number of high schools in minority communities. Between 1992 and 1999,
enrollment in such programs increased by nearly 65%.107 As a final
recruiting device, recently commissioned minority officers may be assigned
the full-time task of persuading underrepresented minorities to apply for
ROTC programs. 108
Affirmative action efforts have opened the door to military education
for record numbers of African Americans, helping to ensure that the
American officer corps is far more racially diverse than it was a generation
ago. Whereas 110 African Americans were admitted to all three service
academies in 1968, nearly the same number are currently enrolled in just
the West Point Class of 2004.109 Of the entire corps of active duty officers,
approximately 19% are racial minorities, including nearly 9% African
Americans."10 This figure, while unprecedented, remains disproportionately
low compared to the nearly 22% of African Americans currently occupying
the enlisted ranks."' Without aggressive race-conscious measures designed
to boost enrollment in the service academies and ROTC programs, military
officials assert that the leadership gap would widen once again, reinstating a
nearly all-white officer corps just as the enlisted ranks become more
racially diverse.' 12
B. The Military's Occupational Need Rationale
The arguments that military experts have invoked in defense of
affirmative action differ substantially from the standard diversity rationale
that emerged in the two decades after the Supreme Court's Bakke
SHEETS: 2001 PROFILES imgs.1-2, at http://www.rotc.monroe.army.miI/scholarshipHPD/
Scholarships%20Fact%2OSheets/2001 %2OProfiles.ppt (last visited Nov. 24, 2003).
106. OFFICE OF THE UNDERSECRETARY OF DEF. PERS. & READINESS, supra note 92, at 32.
Overall, black students were awarded ten percent of all ROTC commissions in 1996. Id.
107. Id. at 40. For a description of the mechanics of JROTC programs, see LAWRENCE M.
HANSER & ABBY E. ROBYN, RAND, IMPLEMENTING HIGH SCHOOL JROTC CAREER ACADEMIES
4-10 (2000).
108. One such program is the Air Force Gold Bar program, which places one minority
recruiter at each affiliated historically black college or university. OFFICE OF THE
UNDERSECRETARY OF DEF. PERS. & READINESS, supra note 92, at 42.
109. See U.S. Military Acad. at W. Point, Class of 2004: Class Profile, at
http://www.usma.edu/Class/2004/profile.asp (last visited Nov. 24, 2003).
110. STATISTICAL SERIES PAMPHLET No. 02-2, SEMIANNUAL RACE/ETHNIC/
GENDER PROFILE BY SERVICE/RANK OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE & U.S. COAST
GUARD 5 (2001), https://www.patrick.afmiU/DEOMI/Observances%20&%2ODemographics/
Deomographics/9-O1 .pdf.
111. Id.
112. See Becton Brief, supra note 7, at 5, 7, 30.
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decision. 1 3 Unlike their civilian counterparts, military officials have placed
relatively little emphasis on the intrinsic benefits students derive from
taking part in a vibrant intellectual atmosphere characterized by the
exchange of diverse viewpoints. Nor have they advanced social justice
claims suggesting that officer commissions are scarce public employments
that should be allocated more fairly across different segments of society.
Instead, the military's chief contention has been that a racially diverse
officer corps is indispensable for ensuring unit cohesion and preserving
high morale among active duty troops.' 
14
The military has traditionally advanced two distinct theories of how a
racially diverse officer corps furthers critical military objectives, both of
which featured prominently in the brief filed by retired military officers in
Grutter. Although conceptually distinct, these strands of reasoning are often
interwoven and used interchangeably in military and court documents. By
examining the implications of each strand separately, we may arrive at a
clearer understanding of how racially diverse leadership affects military
performance.
1. Race as a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
Because military officers are responsible for managing relationships
within a diverse company of troops, sensitivity toward racial matters is
considered an invaluable job qualification. A climate of racial
discrimination, when left unchecked, has proven detrimental to the common
sense of purpose necessary to motivate soldiers in a combat theater.' 15 In
the opinion of military historian Bernard Nalty,
[T]he outbreaks of racial violence [prior to the 1970s] ... could be
seen as manifestations of a general collapse of morale .... At the
root of the problem was a loss of confidence in the military as an
institution, its officers, and its values. Mistrust ave way to
contempt, and contempt to disobedience and revenge.
113. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312-13 (1978) (Powell, J.).
114. See Becton Brief, supra note 7, at 5 (asserting that a "racially diverse officer corps... is
essential to the military's ability to fulfill its principle [sic] mission to provide national security");
see also U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE No. 1440.1, THE DOD CIVILIAN EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM § 5.2.3 (1987) (describing affirmative action programs as "essential
elements of readiness that are vital to [the] accomplishment of the national security mission").
115. See NALTY, supra note 75, at 305-11, 321-24. See generally Holly O'Grady Cook,
Affirmative Action: Should the Army Mend It or End It?, 151 MIL. L. REV. 113, 156-60 (1996)
(citing historical examples of racial tensions undermining unit morale from World War II through
more recent incidents of racial extremism at Fort Bragg).
116. NALTY, supra note 75, at 309.
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Similarly, military experts responsible for overseeing several Army
studies relating to unit cohesion have testified before Congress that the
quality of relationships among soldiers continues to be "a critical factor in
combat motivation." '" 7 Commanding officers alerted to this reality seek to
foster an environment conducive to racial sensitivity, avoiding stereotypical
judgments and punishing instances of racial intolerance. Because
discrimination often occurs in ways imperceptible to most officers,
preserving open lines of communication between soldiers and their
superiors is also critically important.' 8 Above all, soldiers must feel
confident that their grievances will be recorded and taken seriously. As the
Army Affirmative Action Plan asserts, "Leaders at all levels promote
individual readiness by developing competence and confidence in their
subordinates. A leadership climate in which all soldiers perceive they are
treated with fairness, justice, and equity is crucial to the development of this
confidence."1 19
The emphasis on racial sensitivity as a skill useful in crisis management
is understandable given the military's recent history of racial
confrontations. However, this conception does not capture the extent to
which minority officers experience frustrations with their career
environment. 12 For instance, survey data reveal that black servicemen
often resent having to fit into a dominant white culture, in part by
self-consciously adjusting their mannerisms and speech patterns.12' Some
insist that the lack of black officers limits their opportunities for mentoring
because white officers find it more difficult to relate to their experiences. 22
At a minimum, such disaffection, while perhaps not sufficient to spark race
117. Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Armed Servs., 103d Cong. 248 (1993) [hereinafter Policy Concerning Homosexuality]
(testimony of William Darryl Henderson, former Commander of the Army Research Institute).
118. See NALTY, supra note 75, at 282 (describing the 1960s as a time when "communication
between the largely white officer corps and black enlisted men could be so tenuous that a
commander might remain blissfully unaware of patterns of racial discrimination that black
servicemen found infuriating"); see also GROPMAN, supra note 87, at 157 (reporting the Air
Force's assessment that a lack of communication between its officers and airmen accounted for a
pattern of racial tensions).
119. U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET 600-26, DEP'T OF THE ARMY AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION PLAN § 1-4 (1990), http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/p60026.pdf.
120. Based on two thousand interviews, a congressional task force reported sharp differences
in how enlisted personnel from different racial backgrounds rated the equal opportunity climate.
See GEORGE STEPHANOPOULOS & CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR., AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
REVIEW: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT § 7.3 (1995), http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/EOP/OP/html/aa/
aa07.html.
121. See SUSAN D. HOSEK ET AL., MINORITY AND GENDER DIFFERENCES IN OFFICER
CAREER PROGRESSION 61 (2001). See generally OFFICE OF THE UNDERSECRETARY OF DEF.
PERS. & READINESS, supra note 92, at 82-88 (summarizing the findings of numerous surveys).
122. In the words of one black officer, "The biggest hang-up in finding a mentor is that the
[commanding officer] has to see himself as a young [junior officer] in you. [White officers] don't
see us that way." HOSEK ET AL., supra note 121, at 60 (alterations in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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riots, creates powerful disincentives for minority soldiers to exert maximum
effort in their jobs.
The notion that racial sensitivity should be considered a bona fide
occupational qualification does not imply that white officers can never
suitably interact with minorities in their company. On the contrary, much of
the support for affirmative action in military higher education stems from
the belief that white officers become more attuned to racial concerns by
training in an environment that brings them into constant contact with
qualified minorities. 123 Such experiences are thought to be particularly
important for white students who have not had prolonged interactions with
minorities in the past. While this line of reasoning makes a clear case for
admitting more African-American students into military education
programs, its downside is in seeming to treat the presence of black students
as a mere means toward the end of racial sensitivity training. Behind this
view lies the assumption that all officers, regardless of race, can ultimately
develop the race-relationship skills necessary to prepare them for a
leadership role in the future.
Instead, minority officer candidates may, by virtue of their life
experiences, be inherently better positioned to understand and respond to
racial dynamics than are their white peers. Thus, while immersion in a
multicultural environment might conceivably help disabuse white officers
of glaring misconceptions about racial minorities, it is doubtful whether
such training could ever substitute for a lifetime of confronting racial
prejudice and learning to relate to other marginalized members of society.
According to this logic, African Americans should be admitted to officer
training programs not simply because they facilitate useful diversity
training, but also because they bring certain indispensable insights to the
leadership pool.
In the military, higher education serves as the gateway into the officer
corps. 124 Affirmative action at the university level therefore represents a
crucial means of populating the officer corps with leaders who possess the
capacity to manage increasingly diverse enlisted personnel. By highlighting
the importance of diversity within the context of urgent military operations,
the military has attempted to establish a clear link between affirmative
action and a compelling occupational need.
123. See Becton Brief, supra note 7, at 28 ("[P]reparing officer candidates for service, let
alone command, in our racially diverse military is extraordinarily difficult in a racially
homogenous educational setting.").
124. MICHAEL R. THIRTLE, RAND, EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS AND OFFICER-COMMISSIONING
OPPORTUNITIES AVAILABLE TO U.S. MILITARY SERVICEMEMBERS 8 (2001) ("[R]oughly 98
percent of all officers in the military had at least a 4-year college degree in 1996."),
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR981/index.html.
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2. Diversity as a Matter of Institutional Legitimacy
A second strand of argument in defense of military affirmative action
asserts that the mere presence of African Americans in positions of
leadership within the U.S. military helps to dispel perceptions of
institutional bias, reassuring black soldiers and prospective recruits that
their careers will not be artificially constrained by glass ceilings. Given the
slow pace at which the U.S. military has desegregated, it is hardly
surprising that minority soldiers might now look to the current composition
of the officer corps to see how fully the institution has embraced the notion
of equality of opportunity. Without continuing evidence that minorities are
permitted to advance within the leadership ranks, both enlisted personnel
and young officers would be more readily discouraged from excelling in
their duties, to the detriment of company morale. 125 While it may seem
implausible that troops carefully monitor annual promotion statistics for
minority officers, it is not difficult to imagine that a reversion to
commissioning a negligible percentage of African-American officers would
have powerful effects on soldiers' overall perceptions.
Notably, the argument that a diverse officer corps helps to preserve the
military's credibility does not necessarily depend on any actual interaction
between soldiers and minority officers. Instead, this rationale imagines
minority officers inspiring others from afar, much in the way Colin Powell
symbolizes for many Americans the military's more progressive attitude
toward race relations. 2 6 Thus, during the early planning of the Navy's
affirmative action program, one naval commander reasoned:
[I]f I... can be the best naval officer that the U.S. Navy has ever
seen, but just happened to be black, I think that in itself will have
more impact on the black community, my black contemporaries,
and the young blacks that are following, than anything else. If they
realize that... a black can make it... then they are going to look
twice at the possibilities of establishing a [military] career. 7
As this observation suggests, the preservation of a diverse officer corps
is relevant not only to an audience of current soldiers but also to an
audience of prospective recruits. In other words, racial diversity sends
external as well as internal signals regarding the openness of the military as
125. See Cook, supra note 115, at 157 ("If soldiers do not believe ... that they have an equal
chance to progress, then morale and discipline problems will arise which interfere with the
military mission.").
126. See, e.g., Robert Worth, Beyond Racial Preferences, WASH. MONTHLY, Mar. 1998, at
28, 28 (describing a town meeting at which President Clinton defended affirmative action by
making reference to Colin Powell).
127. Disciplinary Problems, supra note 87, at 595 (testimony of Commander B.W. Cloud).
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an institution. It is not surprising that affirmative action programs rapidly
gained momentum at a time when the U.S. military had just shifted away
from the draft and toward an "All Volunteer Force."'' 28 Forced to compete
with the private sector as it tried to attract young minorities into the enlisted
ranks, the military not only engaged in an "energetic public relations"
campaign, but also redoubled its efforts to recruit minority officers. 
129
Finally, it follows logically from the concern for the military's
institutional credibility that white officers-no matter how racially
sensitive-cannot serve interchangeably as inspiration for black troops or
prospective recruits. Here, the desired result depends on the actual presence
of minorities in the officer corps. Military higher education is thus seen as a
critical device for placing minorities into the officer corps and ultimately
into the public eye.
C. The Occupational Need for Racial Preferences Beyond
Higher Education
The notion that occupational need arguments can be logically contained
within the sphere of higher education is unsupported by the military case
study. Just as service academies rely on race-conscious admissions and
recruiting tactics to attract more racial minorities to the military profession,
promotion boards over the past thirty years have taken special measures to
ensure that racial minorities advance into higher, more visible positions of
authority within the command structure.' 30 Specifically, boards have
applied guidelines to ensure both that past discrimination is considered
when evaluating candidates and that minorities are selected at a rate
comparable to the selection of nonminorities.1
31
From an occupational need standpoint, the use of affirmative action in
promotions is justified for precisely the same reasons outlined in the
context of service academy admissions-namely, improved racial dynamics
between the leaders and the led, role modeling and perceived advancement
opportunities, and the maintenance of positive societal impressions.
Notwithstanding this logic, military promotion guidelines designed to
accelerate the advancement of minority officers have attracted criticism. 
32
128. See STEPHANOPOULOS & EDLEY, supra note 120, at 45.
129. MACGREGOR, supra note 77, at 567-68. One sign that the Army is aggressively
pursuing new recruits is that it spends nearly $100 million annually on advertising and has
retained two public relations firms that specifically target minority audiences. Joe Nicholson, U.S.
Army Enlists Burnett Agency, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, July 10, 2000, at 20, 20.
130. For a detailed description of military affirmative action in the promotion context, see
Cook, supra note 115, at 140-45.
131. All services except the Air Force set a goal of equality in their selection rates. Yet these
are aspirations rather than fixed quotas. See HOSEK ET AL., supra note 121, at 24.
132. See, e.g., Cook, supra note 115, at 117 (arguing that the Army's pre-1995 promotion
policy violates the strict scrutiny standard as articulated in Adarand).
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In March 2002, a federal judge declared unconstitutional the Army's
"equal opportunity" promotion instructions, 33 although this position
now seems at odds with the Grutter Court's dicta suggesting that the
military has a legitimate occupational interest in preserving a racially
diverse leadership class.
Despite the Grutter majority's emphasis on the special status of
universities, we have observed that the logical boundary between the use of
occupational need arguments in higher education and work settings is
highly permeable. This conclusion does not necessarily imply that
occupational need arguments should be categorically rejected. Instead, it
underscores the need for a better set of guidelines to determine which
occupational need defenses should be embraced and which should be
treated with skepticism. As I propose in the next Part, a sensible basis for
making such determinations would be to consider the characteristics of each
occupation and weigh the merits of occupational need defenses in these
distinct settings.
IV. DETERMINING THE PROPER SCOPE OF THE
OCCUPATIONAL NEED DEFENSE
A. Salient Features of the Military Case
Although the Grutter majority saw fit to generalize broadly from the
military example,' 34 its assumption that other selective institutions share a
similar occupational profile is problematic. While the military's
occupational need for diversity is instructive, it should not be reflexively
mapped onto other contexts without first understanding what makes the
military's claims rise to the level of a compelling state interest. This
analysis may proceed along two dimensions. The first of these weighs the
importance of the military's occupational success to the public, while the
second assesses the strength of the military's claim that racial diversity
affects its operational viability.
Perhaps the most defining feature of the military as a profession is that
its occupational needs carry life-and-death consequences. Insofar as the
military's race-conscious admissions and recruiting policies support
important national security objectives, the state has a strong interest in
exempting it from the law's broader prohibition against race-based
classifications. As the Court observed in Haig v. Agee, "It is 'obvious and
133. Saunders v. White, 191 F. Supp. 2d 95, 124 (D.D.C. 2002). In this case, the Army
favored racial minorities in promotions to preserve the perception of equal treatment. Judge
Lamberth found that amorphous public perceptions did not rise to the level of a compelling state
interest.
134. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2340 (2003).
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unarguable' that no governmental interest is more compelling than the
security of the Nation."
'1 35
While the consequences of poor battlefield discipline may be measured
in terms of mission outcomes, it is somewhat harder to assess the
importance of continued public confidence in the military as an institution.
The most concrete effect of negative public perceptions would be a drop in
minority enlistment. At a time when the military must contend with
competing enticements in the private sector while also satisfying the
demanding troop requirements of our overseas commitments, a dramatic
drop in minority enlistment could seriously impair national security
interests. 1
36
In addition to the basic urgency of its operations, the military can
mount a strong claim that racially diverse leadership tangibly improves its
ability to perform basic tasks. In place of mere speculation about the value
of diversity in an increasingly globalizing world, military experts, along
with scores of retired professionals, have pointed to a steady stream of
historical episodes that caution against returning to an era of racially
homogenous leadership. 137 While more systematic research on the effects of
racially diverse leadership on modem military performance outcomes
would be useful, military leaders have ample evidence from the past
half-century to suggest that racially sensitive leadership has helped soldiers
overcome a sense of racial alienation while preserving public confidence in
the military. Further lending credibility to the military's argument is the fact
that from the outset of its affirmative action programs, the military has
defined such initiatives in terms of combat readiness and other tactical
considerations. 1
38
The military's heavy reliance on racial diversity can be attributed to
several of its more salient characteristics. First, military leaders in a combat
setting face extraordinary motivational challenges stemming from the
dangerous nature of war and the fact that soldiers are often expected
to follow orders that do not coincide with their natural instincts of
self-preservation. While others have identified the hierarchical nature of the
military as a primary distinguishing characteristic,1 39 this feature is best
understood as an organizational response to the deeper motivational
135. 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (quoting Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509
(1964)).
136. See Michael Hirsh & John Barry, Casualties of War, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 17, 2003, at 22
(describing manpower constraints and the need for continued troop recruitment).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 80-88, 115-116.
138. See supra text accompanying note 119 (describing a key purpose of the Army
Affirmative Action Plan as the promotion of individual combat readiness).
139. See, e.g., Chris Black, Military's Efforts Produced Achievements and Lessons, BOSTON
GLOBE, May 25, 1995, at 25 ("[The military] is a hierarchical model.... You can only push it so
far. It does not really resemble a civilian model." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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dynamics that inhere in military work. In a battlefield environment,
willingness to follow orders thoroughly and promptly without second-
guessing their motivation is of paramount importance. 140 Where mistrust
breeds delay or hesitation, the strategic consequences may be dire.
Underpinning the military's emphasis on unit cohesion is the basic
behavioral insight that soldiers under conditions of duress will adhere to the
group mission with greater intensity insofar as they feel themselves to be
equal and respected members of their immediate community.'
14
Recognizing that race might otherwise become a divisive focal point, the
military seeks leaders who, by virtue of their personal experiences, are
adept at anticipating and defusing these tensions.
Second, the nature of the military's command structure is such that
where tensions arise between soldiers and their leaders, these frustrations
cannot be dissipated through the normal means of exiting the professional
relationship. Because soldiers deployed overseas represent a kind of captive
audience, they have no choice but to interact repeatedly and in close
quarters with their superior officers throughout the duration of their posted
assignments. In the past, this situation has proven conducive to racial
uprisings in the sense that open revolt has been perceived as the only means
of expressing dissatisfaction with the racial attitudes of the military
establishment. It is not surprising, then, that many racially motivated
military uprisings from the Vietnam era took place on naval carriers, which
are particularly isolated and tightly confined communities.
A third factor tending to strengthen the military's occupational need for
diversity is the presence of a large pool of racial minorities in the enlisted
corps coupled with a conspicuous absence of minorities within the officer
ranks. 142 The current extent of racial bifurcation between officers and
soldiers enhances the military's immediate occupational need for
affirmative action insofar as it suggests that a large proportion of minority
servicemembers are not exposed to leaders who are attuned firsthand to the
challenges of being a minority in the armed forces. From an occupational
need standpoint, a return to an all-white officer corps would have fewer
ramifications were the soldier base similarly uniform in its ethnicity. Since
that is not the case, proponents of affirmative action in the military possess
a stronger claim.
140. See NORMAN DIXON, ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MILITARY INCOMPETENCE 174-75
(1976) (describing historical consequences of poor battlefield discipline).
141. Policy Concerning Homosexuality, supra note 117, at 248-51 (testimony of William
Darryl Henderson, former Commander of the Army Research Institute) (describing military
theories of unit cohesion).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 110-111 (comparing percentages of minority officers
to minority enlisted personnel).
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B. Extending Occupational Need Arguments Beyond the Military Context
If the military's distinctive features account for the strength of its
occupational need defense, we must then consider whether the military case
has any meaningful professional analogies. I begin this Section by
describing the military's unique status within antidiscrimination law. After
briefly assessing the case for military exceptionalism, I then turn my
attention to a small number of other public-safety-oriented professions that
share several of the military's salient characteristics. On the basis of these
similarities, I suggest that professions such as law enforcement and prison
administration are well-positioned to mount persuasive occupational need
defenses. Finally, I assess two other professions that feature prominently in
the Grutter decision, namely business and law. While affirmative action
proponents in these fields have fashioned cogent occupational need claims,
I contend that such arguments generally do not carry the same indicia of
reliability and therefore should not be accepted as compelling state interests
within the meaning of antidiscrimination law.
The case for military exceptionalism often begins with the observation
that courts have traditionally granted substantial deference to the military
where its internal decisionmaking has been concerned. 43 Judges have
typically offered two sets of justifications for such deference. The first
relates to the constitutional separation of powers regarding military
affairs; 144 however, the lack of any congressional mandate for affirmative
action policies in the military renders this concern of limited application
here.145 The second is that the military represents a specialized community
that is particularly inscrutable to judges, who lack experience in matters
143. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) ("[C]ourts must give great
deference to the professional judgment of military authorities .... ); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S.
733, 758 (1974) ("[T]he different character of the military community and of the military
mission," including its "necessity for imposition of discipline, may render permissible within the
military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it.").
144. See, e.g., Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 447 (1987) ("Congress has primary
responsibility for the delicate task of balancing the rights of servicemen against the needs of the
military."); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981) ("[J]udicial deference to such
congressional exercise of authority is at its apogee when legislative action under the congressional
authority to raise and support armies and make rules and regulations for their governance is
challenged."). See generally John A. Carr, Free Speech in the Military Community: Striking a
Balance Between Personal Rights and Military Necessity, 45 A.F. L. REV. 303, 307-11 (1998)
(delineating and critiquing the two main strands of the military deference doctrine).
145. Were Congress to mandate military affirmative action in the future, separation-of-
powers arguments could theoretically be used to justify accepting the military's occupational need
for diversity while rejecting similar claims in other professional contexts. In response, however,
other professionals might insist that traditional deference is not necessary to provide a check
against the misuse of occupational need claims. Rather, the application of the business essence
and client preference tests, borrowed from the sex discrimination context, would suffice. See infra
Part V (discussing judicial treatment of sex-based BFOQ defenses).
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such as battlefield tactics. 146 This argument, while sound, ultimately fails to
distinguish the military from other institutions whose inner workings are
equally inscrutable to the average judge. For instance, a prison
administrator with years of experience in correctional settings presumably
has far greater insight than most judges into the dynamics that make the
guard-prisoner relationship function effectively. In the military, as in other
contexts, courts may elect either to defer as a matter of course or to hear
expert testimony and evaluate the strength of the occupational need claims
for themselves.
Just as courts have been reluctant to criticize military determinations
within the Fourteenth Amendment context, they have also held that Title
VII carries no binding force with respect to military servicemembers: As
the law stands, therefore, military employers may freely discriminate on the
basis of race without running afoul of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, provided
that their hiring decisions concern noncivilian personnel. 147 This special
exemption within existing employment law reflects courts' awareness
that the military, unlike most professions, has legitimate occupational
requirements that require the use of discriminatory hiring practices.
1. Prison Guards and Police
The professions of prison administration and law enforcement possess
many of the same characteristics that render the military's occupational
need for racially diverse leadership particularly compelling.148 From a
social urgency standpoint, although neither profession implicates national
security, both perform the analogous social function of minimizing violence
and preserving order. By preventing prison uprisings and deterring
dangerous criminal activity, these professions help forestall "social
emergenc[ies] rising to the level of imminent danger to life and limb.
14 9
146. See, e.g., Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553, 562 (1897) ("'[For] questions not
depending upon the construction of the statutes, but upon unwritten military law or
usage... military or naval officers, from their training and experience in the service, are more
competent judges than the courts of common law."' (quoting Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 178
(1886))).
147. See cases cited supra note 19; see also Cook, supra note 115, at 136 ("Title VII does not
apply to service members.").
148. The similarities between the military and domestic law enforcement have been
well-documented. See NAT'L DEF. RESEARCH INST., supra note 76, at 107-08 (under "4.
Analogous Experience of Domestic Police and Fire Departments" hyperlink) (listing
characteristics that make the police one of the "closest possible domestic analogue[s]" to the U.S.
military).
149. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment) (defining compelling state interest); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct.
2325, 2351 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (recognizing national security and the remedying of past
racial discrimination as the only two compelling state interests sufficient to justify race-conscious
policies).
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Thus, their continued functionality satisfies even the most conservative
definitions of compelling state interest.
Furthermore, both prison administrators and law enforcement officers
face significant motivational challenges, whether in the form of overcoming
inmate intransigence or persuading community residents to cooperate with
police requests. Where respect for authority wavers in either of these
settings, disobedience may prevail at the expense of social order. Reflecting
the fact that elements of the officer-soldier dynamic are present, both prison
guards and police interact with audiences that afford them respect within
the context of a jointly recognized hierarchical relationship. For inmates,
the lack of an exit alternative is obvious. Yet one might also make a similar
argument with respect to law enforcement. Where residents perceive local
police to be racially biased, they cannot easily extricate themselves from
that hierarchical relationship in favor of some more palatable alternative.
Lacking other outlets, public uprisings may seem the only way of
expressing community outrage with racially insensitive police practices.
Finally, the very fact of high minority representation in many prison
populations and neighborhood communities renders it more difficult for an
all-white supervisory corps to discharge its duties effectively. As in the
military example, the stark racial bifurcation between guards and their
captive audiences creates conditions that make affirmative action seem
more pressing from an occupational need standpoint.
Taking the foregoing characteristics into account, there is ample reason
to believe that professionals in the fields of prison administration and law
enforcement may depend on racial diversity to a degree approximating that
of the military. While a profession's basic profile supports certain logical
presumptions about the strength of its occupational need claims, the
substance of those claims can only be understood by examining individual
cases. It is therefore instructive to consider those occasions on which lower
courts have accepted occupational need defenses for racial discrimination.
In Wittmer v. Peters, then-Chief Judge Posner upheld the constitutional
right1 50 of a prison warden to take race into account when hiring guards in a
boot-camp-style prison because "the black inmates [we]re believed unlikely
to play the correctional game of brutal drill sergeant and brutalized recruit
unless there [we]re some blacks in authority in the camp."'15 1 By
150. Witumer's finding of an occupational need defense pertained only to the equal protection
challenge brought against the prison's hiring practices. Because the plaintiffs did not allege a Title
VII violation, Judge Posner's opinion did not reach the statutory BFOQ question. 87 F.3d 916,
921 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J.). Elsewhere, however, Judge Posner has verified that "Title VII's
defense of bona fide occupational qualification.. . is unavailable where discrimination is based
on race, color, or ethnicity." Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1308 (7th Cir. 1989)
(Posner, J.), superseded by statute on other grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, § 101, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071-72 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000)).
151. Wittmer, 87 F.3d at 920.
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underscoring the importance of the boot camp dynamic to its analysis, the
court strengthened its support for an occupational need defense by drawing
an analogy to the military. 52 White correctional officers were not seen as
having the interpersonal skills necessary to motivate minority inmates,
many of whose life experiences had engendered deep skepticism of white
authority figures. Although African-American guards were not regarded as
role models in the traditional sense, 153 their presence was nonetheless
thought to have quelled inmates' fears that the prison administration was
racist and had no real interest in rehabilitating them.
In the realm of law enforcement, several courts and commentators have
suggested that police forces should be given special leeway to consider race
in their hiring and staffing decisions.154 Judge Posner aptly summarized this
position in Reynolds v. City of Chicago:
Especially in a period of heightened public concern ... effective
police work must be reckoned a national priority that justifies some
sacrifice of competing interests. If it is indeed the case that
promoting one Hispanic police sergeant out of order is important to
the effectiveness of the Chicago police in protecting the people of
the city from crime, the fact that this out-of-order promotion
technically is "racial discrimination". . does not strike us as an
impressive counter-weight.
55
The question of how racially diverse leadership facilitates police work
has generally elicited three types of explanations. First, the presence of
racial minorities on the police force alters the perceptions of white officers
who might otherwise harbor unhelpful racial stereotypes. 156 Because many
interactions with minorities occur in a criminal context, white officers may
be at greater risk of developing unhealthy biases that would lead them to
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., Barhold v. Rodriguez, 863 F.2d 233, 238 (2d Cir. 1988) (outlining the
"occupational need" defense of affirmative action in the police context); Note, supra note 61, at
415 (recommending that Congress amend Title VII to create a limited exception for law
enforcement). An occupational need theory was argued before the Supreme Court in a case
involving police promotions, but the Court declined to reach the issue. See United States v.
Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 n.18 (1987) ("We need not decide if either the generalized
governmental interest in effective law enforcement or the more particularized need to overcome
any impediments to law enforcement created by perceptions arising from the egregious
discriminatory conduct of the Department is compelling.").
155. 296 F.3d 524, 530 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.). It bears repeating that in this case, as in
others recognizing a similar occupational need defense for police work, such outcomes have only
been possible because plaintiffs brought constitutional, rather than statutory, challenges. Thus, in
both Reynolds and Barhold, plaintiffs sued under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and did not raise Title VII challenges, despite alleging employment discrimination.
156. See, e.g., id. at 529-30 ("If there are negligible numbers of Hispanics in [the police]
ranks ... non-Hispanic police officers are less likely to be sensitized to any special problems in
policing Hispanic neighborhoods.").
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overly rely on racial profiling in their work. Second, minority police
representation dispels public skepticism of law enforcement, particularly
within minority communities.1 57 Because police work depends heavily on
the cooperation of the surrounding community, a strong sense of mistrust
can severely impair officers' ability to investigate crimes and preserve
public safety. 58 Basing his conclusions on several empirical studies, one
scholar has observed:
A predominantly white police force may face a serious barrier to its
law enforcement activities in the hostility of members of the black
community.... This hostility can be expressed in a variety of
ways, from passive non-cooperation with police investigative
efforts to active rejection of the rule of law; in its most extreme
form, hostility can be manifested in mass rioting or widespread
looting and random violence.
1 59
Finally, courts have recognized that a person's race can affect the
performance of undercover work. For instance, a police department hoping
to infiltrate a drug ring run primarily by whites would prefer to take race
into account when hiring or assigning agents for the job. Because
authenticity hinges on racial similarity, discriminatory hiring has been seen
as justified under these circumstances. 1
60
For simplicity's sake, I have thus far conceived of occupational need
solely in terms of the relationship between prison guards or police and those
in their care, be they inmates or the residents of a community. A separate
theory might address the occupational need for greater minority
representation within a profession's leadership ranks. In other words,
having a critical mass of racial minorities on the police force may foster a
more tolerant work environment, thereby creating conditions for more
157. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REPORT: THE POLICE 167 (1967) ("In order to gain the general confidence and acceptance of a
community, personnel within a police department should be representative of the community as a
whole.").
158. See Reynolds, 296 F.3d at 530 ("Effective police work, including the detection and
apprehension of criminals, requires that the police have the trust of that community and they are
more likely to have it if they have 'ambassadors' to the community of the same ethnicity.");
Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of the Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333,
1341 (2d Cir. 1973) ("[T]he visibility of the Black patrolman in the community is a decided
advantage for all segments of the public at a time when racial divisiveness is plaguing law
enforcement.").
159. Note, supra note 61, at 413-14; see also Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young,
608 F.2d 671, 695 (6th Cir. 1979) (describing racially motivated uprisings against Detroit police
in 1967).
160. See, e.g., Baker v. City of St. Petersburg, 400 F.2d 294, 301 n.10 (5th Cir. 1968)
(identifying undercover work as one arena in which race-conscious hiring might be justified).
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effective law enforcement. 161 Without having discussed every possible
permutation of occupational need claim, it is clear that certain features of
law enforcement and prison administration support those professions'
efforts to demonstrate a strong occupational reliance on racial diversity.
2. Business and Law
Advocates of affirmative action in other, non-public safety professions
have also crafted various occupational need arguments to defend their
continued use of racial preferences, whether in hiring or higher education.
In the following discussion, I address the case studies of business and law
because those categories were specifically cited by the Grutter majority as
examples of elite professions whose occupational reliance on diversity
mirrors that of the military.
Applying the theoretical framework constructed after reviewing the
military case, there are several reasons to suspect that occupational need
arguments may be less persuasive in the fields of business and law. First,
these professions lack the same degree of social urgency as public-safety-
oriented occupations. While the state theoretically has an interest in the
smooth provision of economic services, impairment of this interest
generally does not jeopardize personal safety, engender civil disobedience,
or otherwise rise to the level of a social emergency. Therefore, even were
there a strong occupational dependency on racial diversity within the fields
of business and law, some question would remain as to whether these
professions, even when functional, further compelling state interests.
Second, within most business and legal workplaces, the challenge that
leaders face in motivating their subordinates is less daunting than that
facing military or police officers. In these environments, less emphasis is
placed on compliance with basic orders because independent financial
incentives exist to encourage coworkers to perform their job tasks and
because the tasks themselves are generally more palatable. As a result,
low-level racial antipathy is unlikely to trigger outright abandonment of
workplace tasks to the detriment of occupational performance. Moreover,
where dissatisfaction with workplace culture becomes acute, private sector
employees may exit a firm without significantly disrupting the functionality
of the business. Along similar lines, clients dissatisfied with the lack of
cultural awareness or consideration on the part of service providers are
unlikely to revolt in protest. Instead, they will generally either tolerate this
reality or take their business elsewhere.
161. Applying similar reasoning to the military example, one could examine the impact of
affirmative action on the working relationship between officers rather than focusing exclusively
on the officer-soldier dynamic.
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Surveying both the relevant business literature and numerous amicus
filings in Grutter, there emerge several distinct strands of argument
concerning the occupational benefits of racial diversity in business settings.
The first of these focuses on intra-firm racial dynamics and their effect on
workplace productivity. In a brief filed on behalf of sixty-five American
businesses, amici asserted that "a racially diverse group of managers with
cross-cultural experience is better able to work with business partners [and]
employees .... [I]ndividuals who have been educated in a diverse setting
are likely to contribute to a positive work environment, by decreasing
incidents of discrimination and stereotyping. ' 62 Other scholars and
industry representatives have echoed this observation, stressing the link
between racially sensitive work cultures and firms' capacity for
recruitment, labor retention, and long-term productivity.' 
63
A second strand of argument posits that employees who have been
either educated or raised in multicultural environments tend to be
more adept at "facilitat[ing] unique and creative approaches to problem-
solving arising from the integration of different perspectives."'
164 This
argument strongly resembles the conventional diversity rationale within
higher education, which assumes that racial minorities bring distinctive
viewpoints to a discussion, helping organizations to challenge conventional
assumptions and transcend stale solutions. 
165
A final category of claims concentrates on the employee-client
relationship, arguing that racial minorities play a valuable role in
developing products and services that appeal to an increasingly diverse
customer base. 166 Thus, in its amicus filing, General Motors explained the
pressing need for "managers and employees who understand that people
from diverse backgrounds manifest diverse interests and who know how to
translate that understanding into creative product development, community
outreach, and marketing and advertising campaigns.' 6
7 To illustrate this
phenomenon, scholars have often pointed to Avon Products, which used
162. Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses at 7, Grutter v. Bollinger,
123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (No. 02-241) [hereinafter 3M Briet].
163. See, e.g., Brief of General Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae at 15-16, Grutter (No.
02-241) [hereinafter GM Brief] ("Managers' and employees' cross-cultural competence augments
not only recruiting and retention of employees, but also work force creativity and productivity.
The best ideas and products are created by teams of people who can work together without
prejudice or discomfort."); FERNANDEZ & BARR, supra note 14, at 284-89 (summarizing
recommendations for more racially sensitive leadership techniques).
164. 3M Brief, supra note 162, at 7.
165. See Crockett, supra note 12, at 10.
166. See Brief for Graduate Management Admission Council and the Executive Leadership
Council as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 2, Grutter (No. 02-241) [hereinafter ELC
Brief] ("Employees from different racial and ethnic backgrounds can enhance the development of
products and services for today's diverse marketplace.").
167. GM Brief, supra note 163, at 14.
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input from its diverse workforce to market cosmetics more successfully to
minority communities. 1
68
While the aforementioned occupational need arguments are cogent,
such defenses should not be accepted without stronger assurances that
business needs genuinely depend on race-conscious decisionmaking. Mere
generalities concerning the benefits of racial diversity in the workplace are
insufficient to establish that the central mission of a business would be truly
jeopardized by more racially homogenous leadership. While many
commentators and amici attest to the importance of racial diversity in the
global economy, they provide little evidence to support this proposition. 169
This is not to suggest that no studies have been conducted on this subject. 70
However, even the most convincing data available predict further
productivity gains to be reaped from America's diverse workforce rather
than warn of the severe consequences associated with a loss of diversity. 7 1
Furthermore, studies purporting to show the benefits of diversity in
the workforce often reconfirm the benefits of diverse viewpoints in
problem-solving settings without establishing a persuasive connection
between diversity and productivity. 1
72
The popular notion that an increasingly diverse consumer base demands
employees of matching diversity rests on the largely undocumented
assumption that only racial minorities can develop products and marketing
strategies that appeal to minorities. Even assuming this insight were
accurate, the business consequences of having an all-white marketing team
168. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 12, at 41-42; Don McNerny, The Bottom-Line Value of
Diversity, HR FOCUS, May 1994, at 22, 23.
169. Thus, GM's amicus brief contains only one footnote related to this proposition, and it
concerns the effects of ethnicity on consumer tastes. GM Brief, supra note 163, at 13 n.9. The
ELC brief contains no supporting authority. See ELC Brief, supra note 166, at 5. The 3M brief
contains five such references; however, some of these allude only to business surveys about the
effects of diversity in the workforce. 3M Brief, supra note 162, at 7 n.5; see also Quentin Reade,
Diversity Helps To Deliver Better Business Benefits, PERSONNEL TODAY, June 18, 2002, at 2
(reporting businesses' perceptions of diversity benefits without providing any empirical
confirmation).
170. See, e.g., Taylor H. Cox & Stacy Blake, Managing Cultural Diversity: Implications for
Organizational Competitiveness, EXECUTIVE, Aug. 1991, at 45, 47-52 (reporting studies on the
effect of diversity on problem solving); Robert L. Lattimer, The Case for Diversity in Global
Business, and the Impact of Diversity on Team Performance, COMPETITIVENESS REV., 1998
No. 2, at 3, 8-14 (reporting research findings showing positive effects of workplace diversity on
productivity).
171. See, e.g., Lattimer, supra note 170, at 13-14. Pointing to demographic trends, some have
argued that a racially homogenous business leadership will prove unsustainable in the future.
See FERNANDEZ & BARR, supra note 14, at 11-15. Yet such arguments are more rhetorical than
helpful in explaining how significantly business practices would be impaired.
172. See, e.g., Lattimer, supra note 170, at 6-7. To explain why the occupational benefits of
racial diversity have been so widely accepted in business circles without substantial supporting
data, sociologists have suggested that advocates of affirmative action have gradually recast the
meaning of diversity initiatives, emphasizing their occupational benefits as a means of preserving
their longevity amid a hostile political environment. See Kelly & Dobbin, supra note 13, at
972,975.
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in a globalizing economy have not been established by reference to any
historical data, making it difficult to evaluate the occupational need for a
diverse workforce. Where businesses assert that clients simply prefer
working with people of a particular race, such arguments should not be
accepted as a basis for an occupational need theory. To allow preexisting
societal prejudices to dictate discriminatory hiring practices would be
antithetical to the fundamental purpose of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
Within the field of law, occupational need arguments operate in
substantially similar fashion, with an added emphasis on the importance of
continued public confidence in legal institutions as a whole. In the words of
the Grutter majority, "[C]ultivat[ing] a set of leaders with legitimacy in the
eyes of the citizenry [requires] that the path to leadership be visibly open to
talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity."1 73 Although
this theme was expounded upon by numerous amici, 174 its rhetorical force
substantially outweighs its persuasiveness as an occupational need claim. It
remains unclear precisely how a more skeptical public would threaten the
basic functionality of the legal profession in the future. Whereas the
military posits that negative public perceptions would exacerbate serious
recruitment challenges, the private sector presents no parallel claim.
The Boston Bar Association's amicus filing took a somewhat different
approach, revisiting many of the same arguments raised by leading
American businesses:
Law firms want a diverse staff of lawyers to be better situated to
respond to the needs of their corporate clients and the demands
those clients face in the global market.... Research has identified a
positive correlation between the level of integration among a law
firm's attorneys and the demographics of a law firm's client
base. '71
Yet these claims do not, strictly speaking, concern matters of
occupational survival, nor do they escape the kinds of client preference
criticisms raised above.
Whereas the Boston Bar Association conceptualized the law in terms of
its provision of an economic service to corporate clients, we might usefully
distinguish this from the final scenario described by the American Bar
173. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2341 (2003).
174. See, e.g., Brief for Amicus Curiae American Bar Association at 13, Grutter (No.
02-241) [hereinafter ABA Brief] ("Without effective participation by all segments of society, the
legitimacy of our legal system will be imperiled."); Brief of the Harvard Black Law Students
Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 14, Grutter (No. 02-24 1) ("If the
legal profession regresses toward racial homogeneity, public confidence in the justice system will
suffer.").
175. Brief for Amicus Curiae Boston Bar Association at 10, Grutter (No. 02-241) (citations
omitted).
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Association, which focused instead on indigent clients. In its amicus filing,
the ABA noted that
[m]any marginalized members of society understandably put their
trust more readily in lawyers who possess a shared background or
heritage. It is not simply that the availability of such lawyers affects
the quality of representation that minority clients receive; it may
determine whether that person seeks legal assistance at all. 176
Assuming this model of attorney-client interaction, one could more
easily imagine a scenario in which a lawyer's race might strongly affect her
occupational performance. To satisfy the requirement of social urgency, we
might speculate that the quality of an attorney-client interaction could affect
the outcome of a murder trial, or alternatively, that public confidence in the
racial fairness of the legal profession might help forestall social unrest.
Furthermore, we might argue that just as soldiers are forced to operate
within the hierarchical structure of the military, indigent clients often
possess no exit mechanism through which they may escape instances of
racial bias in the legal system.
Such thought exercises are valuable insofar as they challenge the stark
division between public safety and non-public safety professions,
reminding us that occupational need claims should be evaluated on a case-
by-case basis. Where a particular legal scenario shares more in common
with the military, it lends itself to more plausible occupational need
defenses. Of course, any attempt to generalize about all subcomponents of
any given profession is inherently subject to criticism as circumstances
change and exceptions emerge.
Despite these exceptions, it is nonetheless true that certain work
environments lend themselves more naturally to occupational need
arguments than others. And while one should resist the temptation to create
a rigid taxonomy of all professions, it is nonetheless valuable to generate a
basic framework for approaching occupational need claims in different
contexts. Thus, we may fairly conclude that while a lawyer's race may
sometimes be indispensable to achieving a compelling occupational goal,
such claims are generally more speculative than those raised by the military
or law enforcement. Unlike these latter institutions, it is doubtful whether
most lawyers can demonstrate how race affects their occupational
performance on a regular basis and in a socially urgent manner.
The foregoing analysis about the strength of occupational need claims
in the fields of business and law does not imply that such professions could
never mount a compelling occupational need defense. In fact, one goal of
analyzing the military's justification for affirmative action has been to
176. ABA Brief, supra note 174, at 12-13 (footnote omitted).
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illustrate the kinds of proofs that other professions would need to make to
analogize themselves more convincingly to more traditional public safety
professions in the future. The question of whether additional pockets of
professional life may raise compelling occupational need claims represents
an interesting avenue for future research in this area.
V. TOWARD A UNIFIED FRAMEWORK FOR
OCCUPATIONAL NEED ARGUMENTS
Having developed a sense of where occupational need defenses are
most persuasive, there remains the task of bringing the statutory and
constitutional approaches to these arguments into greater alignment. While
state actors can insulate their use of racial preferences from Fourteenth
Amendment challenges by raising occupational need defenses, neither
government nor private actors have similar recourse under Title VII law.
Aside from generating an obvious intellectual inconsistency within the law,
such a divergence between the constitutional and statutory standards
perversely affords state action greater leniency than private actors where
racial discrimination is concerned. One obvious way of eliminating this
disparity would be to take the approach recommended by the Grutter
dissent, namely to prohibit occupational need defenses even with respect to
equal protection challenges. While this would make constitutional law more
consistent with statutory provisions, it would have the undesirable
consequence of forbidding professions such as the military and law
enforcement from using race-based measures to further socially urgent
occupational interests.
For this reason, a more sensible approach entails removing the Title VII
barrier against occupational need defenses in cases alleging racial
discrimination. Such proposals have been advanced in the past, though
scholars have disagreed over the precise contours of the congressional
amendment that would be required. These proposals can be divided into
two basic camps, the first of which advocates including a narrowly worded
exception to allow specific professions to raise occupational need defenses,
while the second recommends that Congress take the broader step of adding
race to the list of permissible characteristics in the BFOQ provisions of
Title VII.
Exemplifying this first class of arguments, one scholar has proposed the
following statutory language:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall
not be an unlawful employment practice for a municipality to use
race as an employment qualification to integrate its law
enforcement agency so as to reflect the racial composition of the
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municipal population when such integration is necessary to ensure
the agency's effective operation. 
177
One advantage of this approach is that it confines the reach of
occupational need defenses to law enforcement settings, where they are
more likely to be legitimate. A clear disadvantage of this proposal is that it
relies on overly rigid occupational categorizations. As I have discussed
throughout this Note, professions often have subcompartments that are
more or less conducive to occupational need defenses. While
generalizations along the lines of public safety and non-public safety
professions serve as useful heuristics in an academic context, we should be
wary of transforming these into binding statutory classifications. An
additional danger associated with this approach is that it might prove
difficult to adjust the law ex post in light of changing circumstances. Given
the fluid nature of occupational need defenses, a more flexible approach is
advisable.
As an alternative, William R. Bryant has proposed a broader
amendment that would simply add race to the language of Title VII's
BFOQ exception. 78 Bryant's approach is predicated on the understanding
that courts would then restrict the scope of permissible BFOQ defenses by
adopting a set of doctrinal tests similar to those used in the sex
discrimination context. 79 A standards-based approach, described in further
detail below, would enable courts to distinguish between valid and invalid
occupational need defenses in light of uniform criteria while also
facilitating more flexible, case-by-case review of occupational need claims.
But Bryant's proposal is vulnerable to the charge that it does not provide
adequate safeguards against pernicious forms of state-initiated racial
discrimination. Critics could also argue that Bryant places too much faith in
courts' ability to recognize and reject specious occupational need claims.
In light of these concerns, a suitable compromise would be to adopt
Bryant's proposal for removing the statutory barrier against race-based
occupational need defenses yet exhort courts to apply a more rigorous level
of scrutiny to race-based BFOQ claims. In particular, where state action is
concerned, courts should not only consider how substantially a profession
depends upon racial preferences but also whether the smooth operation of
that profession preserves public safety or forestalls social unrest. To further
harmonize statutory and constitutional approaches to government-initiated
occupational need defenses, the social urgency test should be applied not
only as one component of an equal protection analysis but also in the
177. Note, supra note 61, at 442.
178. See Bryant, supra note 63, at 241 ("Congress should amend Title VII to include an
express, race-based BFOQ.").
179. Id. at 220-28, 240-41.
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instances where only a Title VII violation is alleged.'8 ° In this way, courts
could allow for occupational need defenses only in those narrow
circumstances where the most compelling of state interests is at stake, and
then only where racial discrimination would unambiguously further such
interests. For guidance, courts may also wish to consider whether a given
profession shares any of the salient characteristics we have identified as
tending to contribute to more persuasive occupational need claims. Where
the motivational dynamics, exit alternatives, and racial composition
approximate those found in the military, law enforcement, and prison
administration, occupational need claims will likely be stronger.
The addition of race to the list of characteristics that can form the basis
of a BFOQ defense should not be undertaken lightly. At the inception of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, legislators specifically considered and rejected this
very option when it was presented as a proposed amendment to the original
bill. As we have seen, this decision was not the product of mere oversight
but rather the outcome of reasoned debate in both the House and Senate.
181
Notwithstanding the reservations expressed by the framers of Title VII and
echoed by Justice Scalia in his Grutter dissent, there is now ample reason to
believe that courts are capable of distinguishing between genuine
occupational needs and pretextual abuses of the occupational need defense.
To begin, courts have for the most part tightly restricted the use of
BFOQ defenses with regard to sex discrimination. This has been achieved
by applying a series of judicial tests to ensure that the discrimination is not
based on mere stereotypical assessments of women or men.' 82 For instance,
in the case of an airline wishing to hire only female flight attendants, the
Fifth Circuit introduced a "business essence" test, stating that such claims
could only pass muster if "the essence of the business operation would be
undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively."' 83 Since the
essence of an airline is "to transport passengers safely from one point to
another," the argument that women are more adept at providing courteous
reassurances to anxious passengers was rejected. 184 The Supreme Court
180. In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, the Court rejected the notion that Title VII
automatically incorporates the higher constitutional standard of scrutiny where government racial
classifications are involved, explaining that Title VII "was not intended to incorporate and
particularize the commands of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." 480 U.S. 616, 628 n.6
(1987). Nonetheless, for reasons of consistency, we may favor an interpretation of Title VII that
requires more stringent analysis when considering government-initiated BFOQ defenses.
181. See supra Section II.B.
182. See generally Michael L. Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title VII and the Bona Fide
Occupational Qualification, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1025 (1977) (describing the doctrinal approach to
BFOQ claims in the sex discrimination context).
183. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971).
184. Id.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
11352004]
The Yale Law Journal
later embraced a similar formula in Dothard v. Rawlinson, a case involving
a prison's refusal to hire women for certain guard positions. 85
When applying the business essence test, the Supreme Court has
considered whether the "'central mission of the employer's business"'
would be jeopardized by sex-neutral hiring.' 86 As an important corollary to
this test, courts have generally rejected "client preference" arguments,
insisting that merely catering to the requests of coworkers or customers
does not provide sufficient grounds for invoking an occupational need
defense. 87 Thus, for instance, a company may not prefer men in its hiring
process on the basis that its Latin American clients simply prefer to interact
with males. 188 Likewise, cost has typically not been accepted as a legitimate
basis for refusing to adhere to the nondiscrimination principle set forth in
Title VII. '89
A second test that courts have adopted requires that an employer have a
"factual basis" for believing that "all or substantially all" members of the
excluded sex would be unable to perform the duties of a particular job
safely or adequately. 90 This requirement ensures that an applicant's
individual capacity to perform a job is considered before she may be
discriminated against. As a final inquiry, courts have sought to ensure that
no less discriminatory alternative is available. 19
1
It should be noted, however, that courts have not uniformly applied the
aforementioned tests with regard to all types of sex-based occupational
need defenses. Instead, where same-sex privacy issues have been
implicated, cost considerations and client preferences have been accepted as
valid justifications for sex-based hiring in a variety of establishments
185. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
186. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 203 (1991) (quoting W. Air Lines, Inc. v.
Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 413 (1985)).
187. This position tracks the guidelines issued by the EEOC stating that "refusal to hire an
individual because of the preferences of his coworkers, the employer, clients or customers" does
not constitute a legitimate BFOQ defense unless "necessary for the purpose of authenticity or
genuineness ... e.g. an actor or actress." EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex,
29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(iii), (2) (2003).
188. Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1981) (specifying that
"stereotyped customer preference" cannot justify a sexually discriminatory practice).
189. See Amy Kapczynski, Note, Same-Sex Privacy and the Limits of Antidiscrimination
Law, 112 YALE L.J. 1257, 1262-63 (2003) (arguing that "[a]s a rule, courts do not consider cost a
legitimate justification for evading the requirements of antidiscrimination law" because to do so
would "honor[] a self-perpetuating vehicle of discrimination" (footnote and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
190. See, e.g., Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969) ("[I]n
order to rely on the [BFOQ] exception an employer has the burden of proving that he had
reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all women
would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved.").
191. See Bryant, supra note 63, at 224.
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ranging from nursing homes to youth centers.' 92 By taking existing biases
into account when assessing whether members of both sexes could equally
perform a task, courts have strayed from the business essence test as earlier
articulated. For instance, in Norwood v. Dale Maintenance System, Inc., an
Illinois district court sanctioned the sex-based assignment of janitorial
positions, noting that a defendant "may satisfy its burden... by showing
that... guests of a particular business would [otherwise] stop patronizing
the business."'' 93 As Amy Kapczynski has observed, such analysis has not
only permitted sex discrimination to persist but also reinforced "gendered
stratification and hierarchy in the workforce."'
9 4
The history of same-sex BFOQ cases provides a valuable cautionary
tale about the potential for judges to allow existing social prejudices to
influence their assessment of occupational need claims. However, the
lesson to take away from such cases is not that the existing doctrinal
apparatus is inadequate, but that courts must more zealously apply the
standards designed to prevent unsavory forms of discrimination from
surviving legal challenge. Where the "business essence" and "all or
substantially all" tests are faithfully applied, the risk of accepting pretextual
occupational need defenses can be reduced to such a point that the benefits
of a system responsive to valid occupational need arguments outweigh the
costs associated with judicial fallibility.
One reason to believe that judges could apply a standards-based
approach to occupational need claims is that they have already done so in a
handful of cases. Often without saying so explicitly, judges confronted with
race-based occupational need defenses have borrowed substantially from
the doctrinal approach used to evaluate similar claims in the sex
discrimination context. Notably, then-Chief Judge Posner's opinion in
Wittmer stressed that the occupational need defense in that case relied not
on mere "generalities about racial balance or diversity" but rather on sound
historical data demonstrating the link between racial identification and
obedience within hierarchical settings of this nature. 195 Thus, the prison's
defense consisted of more than "just speculation" because it was "backed
up by expert evidence.., that the boot camp... would not succeed in its
mission of pacification and reformation with as white a staff as it would
have had if a black male had not been appointed to one of the lieutenant
192. See, e.g., Fesel v. Masonic Homes of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1354 (D. Del. 1978)
(holding that a predominantly female nursing home may decline to hire male nurses where a
position calls for "intimate personal care" of residents), affdmem., 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979).
193. 590 F. Supp. 1410, 1416 (N.D. I1. 1984).
194. Kapczynski, supra note 189, at 1264.
195. Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 919 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J.). In particular, Judge
Posner referred to reports and testimony by defense experts documenting the relationship between
racial diversity and orderly behavior in prisons. Id. at 917-20.
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slots.' 196 This analysis amounted to an application of the business essence
test as commonly used in the sex discrimination context. Before allowing
an occupational need defense, the court first assured itself that the
race-conscious hiring was genuinely required for the prison to perform its
main function. Judge Posner also noted that his opinion did not stand for the
proposition "that prison authorities are entitled to yield to extortionate
demands from prisoners for guards of their own race."' 97 This assurance
represented a kind of rejection of the client preference rationale, bringing
the analysis into line with the doctrinal approach to occupational need
defenses in other areas of antidiscrimination law.
Likewise, in the law enforcement context, courts accepting
occupational need defenses for racial discrimination have done so only after
applying the equivalent of the business essence test. For instance, when
considering whether New York City could reassign minority officers to
primarily minority neighborhoods in the wake of the Abner Louima
scandal,1 98 Judge Scheindlin stipulated that a successful "'operational
needs' defense" requires the defendant to "show a compelling
governmental interest by establishing: (1) that discrimination against the
black community has characterized law enforcement in the past; (2) that
this discrimination has engendered hostility between black community
members and the police; and (3) this hostility has made law enforcement in
the community ineffective."'1 99 Similarly, in the Reynolds case Judge Posner
reiterated that occupational need in the police context must "be proved and
not merely conjectured," elaborating that "[l~t would not have done for the
City merely to have presented plausible argumentation or to have appealed
merely to common sense.... It proved that it has a compelling need
to increase the number of Hispanic lieutenants .... ,, Correspondingly,
courts have deliberately eschewed client preference arguments in
law-enforcement-related decisions. Thus, Judge Lively of the Sixth Circuit
noted: "The argument that police need more minority officers is not simply
that blacks communicate better with blacks .... Rather, it is that effective
crime prevention and solution depend heavily on the public support and
cooperation which result only from public respect and confidence in the
police. ' 0 '
196. Id. at 920.
197. Id.
198. See Vivian S. Toy, Confidence in Police Has Fallen, a Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3,
1997, at B7 (describing the Abner Louima incident and public reaction to it in New York City).
199. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. City of New York, 74 F. Supp. 2d 321, 327 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (Scheindlin, J.).
200. Reynolds v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 524, 530-31 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.).
201. Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 696 (6th Cir. 1979) (Lively, J.);
see also Talbert v. City of Richmond, 648 F.2d 925, 931 (4th Cir. 1981) (quoting Judge Lively's
language in Young). Along similar lines, a federal judge ruled that student preferences for more
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1138 [Vol. 113: 1093
Race as Mission Critical
Nor have courts automatically accepted occupational need defenses
where public safety professions have been concerned. In McNamara v. City
of Chicago, Judge Posner rejected an occupational need claim raised by a
fire department on the ground that there was insufficient evidence produced
at trial to support the theory that an all-white force would impair public
cooperation with firefighters. 202 Likewise, in Hayes v. North State Law
Enforcement Officers Ass 'n, the Fourth Circuit accepted the occupational
need premise in a law enforcement case, yet declined to embrace the claim
due to insufficient evidence. 1°3
Just as courts have applied a version of the business essence test to
determine the extent of an occupation's dependence on racial diversity, they
have also considered the social urgency of the profession in question.20 4 Not
coincidentally, the few instances in which courts have accepted race-based
occupational need defenses have involved professions whose central
functions entailed the preservation of social order or public safety. It is an
open question how narrowly courts should construe the meaning of
compelling state interest for the purpose of future occupational need
defenses. While a particular racial composition may be critically important
to numerous professions, not all of those professions perform functions that
are indispensable to the state. A conservative definition requiring a
potential danger to public safety would have the advantage of narrowly
confining BFOQ arguments. Yet regardless of how courts construe the
compelling state interest requirement, the simple fact of their taking the
social urgency of a profession into account will ensure that only certain
professions are eligible to invoke occupational need defenses.
Although my focus has primarily been on the disparity of legal
approaches to government-initiated occupational need defenses, it is also
worth considering the implications of a Title VII amendment for private
actors. Were race added to the list of BFOQ characteristics, private actors
wishing to raise occupational need defenses would need to establish only
that racial preferences are "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business or enterprise," 20 5 without regard to the social
urgency of that enterprise. In practice, this would require that private
employers pass the "business essence" and "all or substantially all" tests
minority officers were insufficient to justify discriminatory hiring of campus police. See Ray v.
Univ. of Ark., 868 F. Supp. 1104, 1126-27 (E.D. Ark. 1994).
202. 138 F.3d 1219, 1222 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, C.J.).
203. 10 F.3d 207, 214 (4th Cir. 1993) ("If this is found to be enough evidence to justify the
need for race-conscious policies, we fear others could use this same rationale for a much less
benign purpose.").
204. See, e.g., Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 329 ("Upon careful
consideration, it is my conclusion that the need for effective law enforcement can be a compelling
state interest.").
205. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2000). The language of the BFOQ exception within Title VII
makes no reference to the nature of the profession invoking the defense.
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just as they have done in the sex discrimination context. Assuming that
courts rigorously inquire into the relationship between racial preferences
and stated occupational needs, such an arrangement would still provide
adequate safeguards against unwanted prejudice.2 °6 The mere fact that
private discriminatory conduct would be subject to somewhat less stringent
judicial review than state action should not raise concerns, particularly in
light of the Court's past assessment of the relative potency of Title VII and
the Equal Protection Clause where race is concerned.20 7
For proponents of affirmative action, the development of a race-based
occupational need rationale represents an enticing new means of defending
an old policy. Still, many of its strongest advocates would recoil at the
remarks of congressmen who used similar logic to defend white southern
businesses in the 1960s. The fact that perceptions change when the race
being advantaged is swapped suggests that the occupational need rationale
often provides intellectual cover for a set of more deeply held beliefs.
Allowing this trend to continue risks establishing a series of loopholes
within antidiscrimination law that may outlast the immediate circumstances
of their creation. We should therefore narrowly construe the occupational
need defense to ensure that where the core premise of antidiscrimination
law is suspended, it is not without good reason. This would have the added
benefit of encouraging advocates of affirmative action in fields such as law
and business to acknowledge the extent to which other considerations
animate their thinking. By resisting the intellectual detour that occupational
need arguments present, proponents of affirmative action, whether in higher
education or in the workplace, would be better able to defend their position
in terms of the social justice claims that lie at its core.
CONCLUSION
Following the Supreme Court's announcement that it would revisit the
issue of affirmative action in higher education for the first time in a
generation, numerous amici filed briefs in support of the University of
Michigan Law School's race-conscious admissions procedures. Relying on
these filings, the Grutter Court embraced the notion that various
professions have important occupational interests in perpetuating racially
diverse higher education, and suggested that these considerations could rise
to the level of compelling state interests.
The purposes of this Note have been to trace the roots of, further
delineate, critique, and consider potential applications of what I have
206. See Bryant, supra note 63, at 228.
207. See supra note 180. Thus, while Title VI has been deemed coterminous with the Equal
Protection Clause, see supra note 23, the same has not been said of Title VII, at least with respect
to race.
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termed the Supreme Court's "occupational need rationale." Through an in-
depth study of the military and its reliance on occupational need logic, I
have sought to develop a more concrete understanding of how racial
diversity facilitates occupational performance and to assess which other
professions have raised the most convincing occupational need defenses.
In place of the Court's current all-or-nothing approach to occupational
need defenses, I have proposed a more fact-driven inquiry into the
characteristics of each profession raising such arguments. By considering
the extent of the public's interest in a given occupation's continued
viability, as well as the degree of that occupation's dependence on racially
diverse leadership, we may capture the valuable insights of the Grutter
majority while responding to the most serious criticisms raised by the
dissent.
In order to bring greater intellectual coherence to this area of the law,
Congress should amend Title VII to remove the statutory barrier against
race-based occupational need defenses. Armed with greater flexibility,
judges should tightly construe these defenses, requiring that they satisfy
doctrinal tests even more rigorous than those currently used to guard
against illegitimate forms of sex discrimination. While such an approach is
not without its risks, there is substantial reason to believe that courts are
capable of distinguishing between authentic and pretextual occupational
need claims.
Under such a system, I anticipate that certain public safety professions
would emerge as the most likely candidates to raise successful occupational
need defenses. Yet regardless of how the future unfolds, forty years of
debate in both statutory and constitutional contexts suggests that the time is
ripe to reconsider the proper place of occupational need arguments within
antidiscrimination law.
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